From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Sunday, April 21, 2002 7:42 PM To: alt.atheism.moderated Subject: Re: Part 1: Re: evidence of god? for Holtz [G Riggs] "Elizabeth Hubbell" wrote: > I'm wondering what heading (personal, genetic, > memetic?) you might place the "compassion, justice, ecosystemic > survival" nexus under. I would classify these as altruism, and not any of the three kinds of self-preservation. > is there some fourth branch of the survival family that > one can glimpse here? I can't think of one. > Since you do not--at least at this point--point to initial flaws in > Noncognitivism, may I take it that you find yourself gravitating > partly to that alongside Emotivism and Prescriptivism Emotivism and Prescriptivism are forms of Noncognitivism, and are not really "alongside" it. > do you feel uncomfortable with the entire concept of > justification of values altogether, making all these schools > of thought pretty much equally moot [..]? I think values can be justified, just not objectively. > (I'm not sure whether you are introducing each of these as necessarily > mutually exclusive.....?) Cognitivism and Noncognitivism are indeed mutually exclusive. > couldn't the very process of evolution itself be seen through the lens > of extropy? Certainly evolution is to be highly valued if one values extropy. > > Systems like life that undergo evolution > > by natural selection are the best source of such complexity and > > organized diversity." > > --making extropy a valid--however atypical--construct for certain > isolated phenomena around us? I don't understand your question. > is autonomy conducive to preservation of *kind*? Yes, because it is conducive to preservation of self, which is ultimately necessary for preservation of kind. > However, autonomy in every other way as well? I don't understand your question. > > Altruism both conflicts with and fails to harness natural > > appetites and intentions." > > Since I have still seen no convincing argument that altruism must > *always* conflict with natural intentions, I never said it did. > despite its being *sometimes* in conflict with other instinct > (but that's true of a number of equally real but conflicting > instincts that human beings choose between all the time) But Altruism's aforementioned conflicts and failures are much more serious than those of Extropianism (or, say, Utilitarianism). > altruism may one day trump many an inclination to > selfishness that we today take for granted Contrasting altruism with "selfishness" is to dodge the question of whether altruism conflicts with the self-interest that is so necessary for survival of self and kind. > > What would an omnipotent omniscience value? > > Possibly, serenity through the contentment and > stability observed in enlightened organisms. But serenity seems too boring, and such stability would be too trivially achievable. > Perhaps evolution has produced a > superconsciousness or two already Elsewhere in my book I explain why superintelligence is not possible. > Are you therefore implying that, since > cetaceans and apes cannot even be considered dependent persons, any > obligations, such as those you've cited above, to minimize > unavoidable/unnecessary suffering can not apply to them? No, they still meet the definition I gave of beings, and I said that "all beings have the right not to suffer torture or extinction". > > possible to duplicate a person, [..] split a person [..] > > joined persons. > > I swear you should write a science-fiction story. Some would say the Futurology section of my book is pure science fiction... :-) > [externalities] you'll have to explain to me again. See section 5.1.2.2. (Social Science / Economics / Microeconomics / Market Imperfections) of my book: Externality is a cost imposed or benefit bestowed on a person other than those who agreed to the transaction that created the cost or benefit. Negative externalities are costs such as pollution or overconsumption of natural resources. Positive externalities are benefits such as scientific discoveries and incremental technical advances. > > The infliction of opportunity costs, as through competition, > > does not by itself constitute aggression. > > one could say that one example of the infliction of > opportunity costs is Monopoly Good point. I'm changing this to: The infliction of opportunity costs through non-monopolistic competition does not by itself constitute aggression. > I simply will never accept the notion that > it can be judicially defensible to contemplate a > premeditated taking of life in cold blood, no matter > the sober legal framework. To be unwilling to take a murderer's life is to devalue his victim's life. The necessity of the death penalty is simple to demonstrate. It follows from two indisputable premises: 1) No finite sentence of incarceration is just punishment for first-degree murder. 2) Indefinite incarceration of a murderer eventually dissolves into the almost-unjust incarceration of a very old man who is increasingly ethically unrelated to the younger man who committed murder decades (or centuries?) earlier. As an example, note that of all the Nazi war criminals given life sentences at Nuremberg, only Rudolph Hess (IIRC) was still in prison by the late 1950s or so. > I've always felt uneasy at the thought that The Law itself > and its enforcers can somehow be permitted to perpetrate something > deemed criminal in a private individual, whether that crime be murder, > rape, or whatever. "The Law itself and its enforcers" are "somehow permitted to perpetrate": coercive taxation, employment of coercive police power for enforcement of contracts, regulation of natural monopolies, establishment of a standing army to prevent foreign aggression, etc. All of these things are "deemed criminal in private individual[s]". > Either murder is a crime or it ain't. Murder -- deliberate killing of an innocent person -- is always a crime. > premeditated *intention* to kill a human being and carrying that out is > coldblooded premeditation, pure and simple. Not all human beings are innocent. > If premeditated murder is a crime, then The Law itself > is compromised when given some mediaeval dispensation to > perpetrate that crime. Bzzt. The state is simply *not* "given dispensation" to commit the deliberate killing of an innocent person. The state is indeed given a monopoly on executing murderers -- just as it has a monopoly on its other aforementioned powers. > "The most liberty for the most persons" could be distorted > to legitimize the out and out slavery of a minority merely > to facilitate the dawn-to-dusk comforts of a majority. No, because "comforts" are not liberty. But what if you had instead said "the freedom of the majority from marginal state coercion such as taxation"? I would then say: yes, but only by use of a distorted metric of liberty that counts the absolute enslavement of one person as subordinate to the marginal liberation of others. > > Rent resource access to the highest bidders > > could you amplify somewhat on this last power? Auctioning water rights; auctioning licenses to pollute; etc. > the region would get a free ride from the state's > exercise of its duties. > > could you give an example of [this]? Iowa seceding because it doesn't like helping pay for the Navy and Coast Guard. > > Artificial monopoly should only be regulated to the extent it > > is anti-competitive. > > But isn't that what defines monopoly? Monopoly *is* inherently > anti-competitive, isn't it? One can have enough market share to control an industry and nevertheless refrain from erecting barriers to entry or extracting monopolistic profits. > > Libertarianism protects rights and promotes prosperity > > better than any other political system. > > Short-term or middle-term prosperity, yes, but long-term > prosperity can theoretically be jeopardized by social unrest > under certain conditions. Yes, and communism could "theoretically" work under "certain conditions" involving people being willing to work without incentives. You're confusing logical possibility with sociological likelihood. > I've yet to hear a thoroughly fleshed-out exposition of how > pure-form libertarianism can be 100% successful in > stemming social unrest. By "pure-form libertarianism" do you mean anarchism, or would you include my system of statist libertarianism with a safety net against mortal dangers? Do you count it as less than "100% successful" if a single person is envious of any other person? > Isolated deprivation will or will not be present "Deprivation" implies a depriver, and thus (illegal) aggression. Isolated indigence -- or at least degrees of prosperity -- will certainly be present, but you could make the same (inherently flawed) argument against anything short of pure equalitarian communism. > can one always guarantee a complete > absence of any destabilizing deprivation and social resentment? Can we guarantee that the indigent always have an alternative to death through starvation, exposure, or disease? Yes. Can we guarantee that BMW drivers won't resent Mercedes drivers? No. So? > I'm also, frankly, surprised at your apparent faith in pure-form > libertarianism, given your apparent acceptance of the notion that the > state can legitimately take a life in the context of a judicial > process. Isn't this a contradiction? It would be if I were an anarchist. I'm not. I instead advocate a short list of coercive state powers that I argue would yield more liberty than anarchism would. > > Protect ongoing access to unowned resources > > Collect rent for use (e.g. pollution) of unpossessable resources > > Doesn't that tacitly point to the > possibility that it can indeed be *sometimes* "coercive for private > parties to freely associate" under certain circumstances? No, imposing negative externalities (like resource pollution or deprivation) on third parties does not constitute "free" association. Anti-competitive monopoly is the only coercive form of free association. So I've changed the text to: The fundamental ethical mistake of Welfare Statism is the notion that it can be coercive (outside anti-competitive monopolies) for private parties to freely associate or decline to associate. > please define what you meant by "unpossessable resources"? A possessable resource is one, such as land or sunlight, of which a part may be controlled such that any outsider's use of it is easily detectable by the controller. Any other resource is unpossessable. > some resources should indeed not be owned privately? That's why I wrote: "Property can consist only of possessable resources, [..]". > I believe that, if humanity is to survive, a mixed economy > will be the ultimate way we'll have to go I believe you're clearly wrong. > there are dangers in resources like > air and water being held privately frankly resonates with me Scuba tanks and water wells are not dangerous. What I'm saying is dangerous (i.e. wrong) is someone flying or floating a banner saying "this atmosphere/ocean is mine". > > The Eightfold Path mistakenly assumes that no value can be maximal -- > > that any value can be desired too much. This is not true for > > values like extropy, intelligence, and justice. > > When you say that this is not true for extropy, intelligence, and > justice, I assume that you are giving your own take, not Buddha's. Right. > if you're excepting extropy, intelligence, and justice, how about > your previous virtue, Kindness? No, it is quite possible to be too kind. > you eventually name Kindness as the most sublime virtue. But it is not the same thing as altruism or material charity. > all evil redounds only to short-term self-interest Even *I* am not that naively optimistic! > enlightened--and long-term--self-interest, must always yield > Good in its result. I don't see how you can guarantee "always". Also, this is a truism unless you explain how "enlightened" means something other than "Good". > > In their natural social environment of family and community, > > humans tend naturally to be more good than evil, and to > > cooperate for mutual benefit. > > why do you think this is so? Because people who cooperate with each other can out-compete people who aggress against each other. > I am sincerely interested in how, directly, one can rigorously > trace such cooperative tendencies right back to the very > emergence of mammals, if possible Intelligent sociality is indeed almost exclusive to mammals, but it is not common to all of them and seems to have developed independently in Carnivora, Pinnipedia, Proboscidea, and (especially) Cetecea and Hominoidea. > > Industry is economic, intellectual, or artistic production. > > As part of a concept of industry, one might add "contributing > to the alleviation of earthly suffering, even for those whom > one knows least". That isn't part of the usual concept of industriousness. It is instead part of Kindness, and (as I said) the most effective way to alleviate suffering is to fight injustice and ignorance. -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net