From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org]
Sent: Thursday, June 20, 2002 2:52 AM
To: alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Science & atheism are cultures.

"Jesse Nowells" <jnowells@transbay.net> wrote:

> Obviously, the other guy

His name is Paul.

> doesn't want to call nothingness a state of
> affairs if he is defining state of affairs as having some physical
> existence.

He indeed seems to be assuming a state of affairs requires
e.g. spatiotemporality.  That assumption is unjustified.

> Why don't you cut the B.S. & recognize that there are two 
> different definitions going on here?

Just what else do you think I'm doing by pointing out our
differing assumptions?  Assumptions == stipulations == definitions.

> I suspect that the other poster is suspicious of you
> equivocating on these two definitions.

Pointing out differing assumptions is hardly "equivocating",
and in fact is the opposite.

> > > "2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of
> > > objects (things)."
> 
> > You explicitly assume that a "state of affairs" must include 
> > at least one object, but don't (as far
> > as I can tell) attempt to justify this assumption.
> 
> He can justify this "assumption" because it follows from the definition
> quoted above & you're not even addressing that.

His definition *includes* the assumption I dispute, and I
pointed that out.  This couldn't be much more obvious...

> > I define 'absolute nothingness' as the situation or state of affairs
> > in which no entity has ontological existence.
> 
> Which means there is no entity, only a label for an entity.

What "label"?  There is an empty domain set, and a zero-length
list of propositions about the objects in that set.  Where's
the "label"?

> > > You seem to hold that sets exist in
> > > exactly the same ontological way as our physical universe does
> 
> > I never said that.  How is that implied by anything I've said?
> 
> You signify a state of affairs of nothingness as if there is a
> somethingness about nothingness but that somethingness is only a label, a
> pointer to nothing.

Nothing I've said about sets imply their physicality.  If by
'somethingness' you mean physicality, you are just asserting
and not arguing.  If by 'somethingness' you mean anything other
than physicality, then you've failed to show how that anything-other
1) is implied by what I've said and 2) implies physicality of sets.

> > You're blatantly assuming our nomological conservation principles as
> > necessary, when of course they're contingent.
> 
> You're blantantly presuming he is blantantly assuming what is evidently
> the likely case as necessarily being the case.

There is no reason to think it is "likely" that our nomological
conservation principles are logically or even metaphysically 
necessary, and I doubt you can cite a philosophy reference work
that says otherwise.

> > > the purely abstract thought process of "object
> > > subtraction" as described in text grossly flouts the nature of being
> 
> > No, it just flouts some of the contingent physical laws of our
> > particular universe.
> 
> & what purpose is "flouting"?

I don't understand your question.

> What other particular universe can you point to

I can point to possible universes in which conservation laws do not hold.

> as being actual?

As I've told you repeatedly, there is no demonstrated difference 
between actuality and mere possibility for universes.

> What is your justification for "flouting"  physical laws?

When did I say I am "flouting" physical laws?

> Are you trying to get your magic broom to work so you can play
> quidditch?

Huh?
--
brian@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net