From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Sunday, August 11, 2002 9:58 PM To: Alt.Atheism.Moderated Subject: Re: Science & atheism are cultures. "Jesse Nowells" wrote: > > Because, as I've told you repeatedly, 'reality' cannot mean for > > other worlds the same thing that you think it means in > > this world. > > ['reality'] refers to something that is > evidenced or arguably so because of some objective data. Bzzt. By 'objective' you presumably mean something like mind-independent, which I already explained is inadequate because it is just an excluder predicate. > The term "actuality" refers to existence. Bzzt. Again: that's not a definition, that's an assertion of synonymy. > The only way to say that actuality & > possibility are equivalent in reference to "other worlds" is to redefine > the term "actuality". False. The usual sense of 'actuality' is not applicable in the domain of other worlds, so identifying a sense for that domain is not "re"-defining -- it's just defining. > you're equivocating between two definitions of the > term "actuality" No, I'm merely distinguishing two non-overlapping domains in which (as I've demonstrated) the term CANNOT have the same meaning. > To say that because you can't > "distinguish" between possibility & actuality for other worlds, is an > argument from ignorance because you *presume* that they are equivalent. > Their equivalence is a "mere" possibility. You are incorrectly assuming that 'existence' for worlds has some well-defined criteria and that I'm just relying on the fact that we don't or can't know whether a given other world satisfies those criteria. That's not my position at all. Rather, I'm saying that no such criteria have been identified. > > If a term "has no application" in a given > > domain, then it obviously false to say it "has a distinct meaning" > > in that domain. > > No, it has a distinct meaning regardless of the domain It has a distinct meaning that is tied to its domain of definition, and it is obviously false to say it has that same meaning in this other domain. > > No, I have repeatedly demonstrated that your attempted definitions > > are merely either proposals of synonymy, or incomplete lists of excluder > > predicates that do not exclude all merely-possible worlds. > > Actuality is a synonym for existing Yes, and their common defintion only applies within a given worlds, and not across worlds. > so saying that another world's > actuality is equivalent to its possibility is either an implict claim of > another world existing No, it's an explicit claim that actuality for another world should to be defined as its possibility. If you had an alternative way to define actuality for other worlds, you'd have a basis for declining this recommendation. But you don't. > > Possibility is quite well-defined for other worlds, namely: > > having a world-model that contains no contradictions. > > OK, but actuality is not "well-defined" or defined at all. If possibility for other worlds is well-defined and actuality for other worlds is defined as possibility, then actuality for other worlds is well-defined too. > If an "other-world" existed, by whatever means or rules, then > its actuality would be defined under the criteria of the rules that > universe operates by. No, 'actuality' is (like any word) defined by its use in the relevant linguistic community. Speakers of English use it in a way that can be demonstrated to mean "causally connected to this (i.e. the indexed) universe". So actuality in another world would mean (to us speakers of English) causal connectedness in that world. But actuality OF that world (to us) would need some other definition, since (by definition) no other world can be causally connected to ours. If you have some other such definition, I'd love to hear it. > > I never said I can't describe, or discern anything about, other possible > > worlds. Indeed, I've explicitly said that other worlds are *defined* > > by listing propositions about them! > > What you did say was that you can't "distinguish" between these > possibilities & their actualities but how could you if they're not > evidently "actualities"? You just don't get it. I'm merely making the lexicographical observation that there aren't on the table two discernably different definitions of 'possibility' and 'actuality' for other worlds. You are (once again) incorrectly assuming that discovering such definitions is a matter of empirical investigation, when it's really just a matter of picking them. > It sounds like you're trying to presume the > existence of things you don't have any evidences of It sounds like you're trying to presume that it's meaningful to talk about the "existence" of things (other worlds) which lie outside the domain of your definition of 'existence'. > or you're making a > mountain out of a molehill over the fact that if these worlds exist then > there would be a congruence between their actualities & their > possibilities. You (yet again) assume ("if these worlds exist") that there is some prior notion (i.e. definition) of the existence of other worlds. > If actual doesn't mean "real" then the > term, as it is being used to refer to "other worlds", is meaningless. 'Real' isn't any more well-defined for other worlds than 'actual', so you shouldn't pretend you've identified a substantive alternative. As I told Paul, I have no problem with people recognizing that the "existence" of other worlds is meaningless. But since people like you are going to continue to say things like "if these worlds exist", then I'm going to continue to explain to them that -- unless they take existence to mean possibility for other worlds -- their statements are meaningless. > > I've never said they are "unknowable" or "unknown", and your use > > of quotation marks to imply that I ever have is blatantly deceptive. > > I'm not trying to be "blantantly deceptive". Perhaps that is a projection. Unless you can cite me using quotation marks so sloppily, your "projection" crack is worthless. > If I were you, I would concentrate on making your idea clearer. It's called Modal Realism, and I don't think my presentation of it contradicts the relevant philosophical literature. If I were you, I'd go read about it, or at least stop making statements (e.g. about "argument from ignorance) that I can refute simply by repeating my unrebutted demonstration of your incorrect assumptions. > If we > don't have the criteria, is it possible that we can get the criteria > needed? Sure -- by stating a definition of 'existence' for other worlds that speakers of English would agree is substantive and not just an assertion of synonymy. > If not, are these "worlds" in effect, unknowable? This is an analytic issue, not an empirical issue. Your question simply demonstrates how completely you fail to grasp my position. > Then the term "actuality" in reference to other worlds is meaningless > without a definition of existence for other worlds. So, claiming > equivalence is *mere* speculation. Speculation is empirical, but what I'm doing is analytical. -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net