From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org]
Sent: Wednesday, March 06, 2002 1:21 PM
To: alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Infinity (was: You' have to be God....ATTN: PH)


"Buridan" <jim@nospamma.humph65.fsworld.co.uk> wrote

> > When we examine what
> > constitutes my idea of six and that of any other sane person,
> > we see that the ideas are identical -- that they have the
> > same identity.
>
> You may not be able to distinguish
> qualitatively, say,   your idea of 6 today from your
> idea of 6 yesterday, but that does not
> mean that they are the same single idea

Yes it does, from the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.
Feel free to refer to the discussion of Identity in section
1.1.1 (Philosophy / Metaphysics / Ontology) of my book.

You are again confusing my consideration or contemplation
of an idea with the idea itself. Individual contemplations
of the idea "six" can of course be distinguished, but the
idea or concept itself is (by definition) the same for everybody.

> any more than two photocopies of an original are the same single
> photocopy.

Any two photocopies are distinguishable, or else we would
not count them as two. (Distinguishability includes location
in spacetime, of course.)

> > > And if ideas are mental events then plainly nobody can have
> > > the same idea more than once: thus the same person has
> > > different sixes on different occasions.
> >
> > You're confusing the consideration or contemplation of
> > an idea with the idea itself.
> >
> No, you are!  One idea ( of six) happened yesterday,
> the other did not.

'Idea' has at least two senses: that which one might contemplate,
and the act of contemplation itself.  Acts of contemplation
are indeed mental events, but concepts (that which one might
contemplate) are not.  They are simply what is in common among
all the relevant acts of contemplation.

--
brian@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net