From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2002 11:31 AM To: alt.atheism.moderated Subject: Re: The psychology of Atheism Jim Humphries wrote > > Such claims[ of life after death] > > are by definition meaningless, > > > The claim that there is or might be life after > death very clearly is not meaningless. Your quote is blatantly out of context. What I wrote was: There are of course claims that can be made about life after death that are not empirically verifiable or falsifiable, and thus are not subject to scientific investigation. Such claims are by definition meaningless > > science tells us that the > > only mechanisms known to enable consciousness are not > > operant after death. > > > In fact there isn't an agreed scientific theory of > consciousness Philosophers indeed dispute whether the phenomenological aspects of consciousness imply that it cannot be reduced to the purely physical, but no philosophers seriously dispute that consciousness depends on physical mechanisms such as the human brain, and that those mechanisms are not operant after death. > ie we don't really know what 'enables' it. We know enough to know it depends on physical mechanisms. And you know this well enough not to dare answer my question: do you claim that life after death is in agreement with, or coheres with, or is indicated by, or is supported by, or is compatible with, or is empirically consistent with, the known laws of nature? You also know it well enough not to answer this challenge: life after death is at odds with what science tells us are the necessary and sufficient conditions for life and consciousness. I challenge you to assert the negation of this statement. > 3. On Parsimony > ------------------ > > > ceteris paribus conditions > > > do not obtain in the case of theism v naturalism [..] > > > > And I've already demolished that point elsewhere. > > > I challenge you to present your alleged 'demolition' here. Elsewhere in the same posting I wrote the following (which you ignored): If by "maximally perfect" you imply the property of self-causing, then we can say that the universe itself is as likely to be self-causing as is any god. (Ontological arguments to the contrary simply confuse the notions of logical and ontological necessity.) If not, then SuperGod is needed to explain El/Yahweh. > it is not true that of different explanations the simplest > is invariably the correct one. Not only are you unable to answer my position, you are not even able to repeat it correctly: you said "invariably" instead of ceteris paribus. > 4. On Religious Experiences > -------------------------------- > > Unless you're willing to say that all such religious > > feelings are actual experiences of the divine, then you > > have to posit both divine *and* psychological > > explanations. I need only posit the latter. > > Do you or do you not posit both divine *and* > > psychological explanations? > > > I have explained to you that [..] these phenomena are > grounded in God's activity. Therefore, an adequate > scientific ( psychological) explanation of a > religious experience would not show that God isn't its cause. And I have explained to you that it's therefore unparsimonious and uneconomical to claim that these already-explained phenomena are also "grounded in God's activity". If "God being the cause" is neither verifiable nor falsifiable, then this statement is not only unparsimonious but also meaningless. > to explain religious experiences > in terms of a deity ( a single hypothesis) is > arguably simpler than positing many different hypotheses: > schizophrenia, hysteria etc etc.. [You admit below > that these are different explanations: "...which > member of my set of psychological explanations"] And I pointed out that you subscribe to every one of these different psychological explanations as well. I challenge you now for the third time to say which member of my set of psychological explanations is never operant. You have failed to identify a single one. Therefore, you are saying that the same set of explanations is operant (though of course not all apply to every instance), plus your extra theological explanation. Is the above argument so devastating to your position that you can't even bring yourself to quote it? > > > Ockham's razor does *not* say that the simpler/est > > > explanation will be true, or should be considered to be such. > > > > It should and is. [I note below your failure to provide > > a single counter-example to this principle.] > > > I'm afraid not. It suffices here to simply restore the sentence (in brackets above) that you deleted instead of dared respond to. > See the reference to 'On Occam' > [Kaye and Martin] provided earlier. If Kaye and Martin have a good argument that the idea of parsimony -- i.e. economy of explanation -- applies only to ontology and not to explanations generally, then please present it. > > I didn't say you were. I simply challenged you to say which > > member of my set of psychological explanations > > I've now got you to admit that you are presenting > several explanations! Yes, and one less than you are presenting. I never claimed I was only presenting a single explanation. Your pose of triumph here is quite bizarre... > > you are saying that the same set of explanations is operant > > (though of course not all apply to every instance), plus > > your extra theological explanation. > > > Its not an extra explanation. I hold to > the single hypothesis that a single agent is responsible > for the variety of religious experiences. You subscribe to the same explanations that I do, and add that "a single agent is responsible for [all of them]", but cannot cite a single case that is not explained if this addendum is ommitted. Thus your addendum is unnecessary, uneconomical, and unparsimonious. > > there is no reason not to dispense with belief in any > > such deity if it adds nothing to the existing naturalistic > > explanation. > > > I've explained to you how naturalism cannot > explain the most basic level laws You here blatantly switch topics, from explaining religious experiences to explaining fundamental scientific laws. I'll take this as an admission that explaining religious experiences does not require positing your god(s). > - it just says > 'they just are'. Theism certainly can explain them. Theism does not explain why these laws exist instead of other possible laws. Nor does theism offer a convincing explanation of why God "just is". Any such explanation is no better than the anthropic modal explanation I described last week in the "Science & atheism are cultures" thread. > There are a variety of other arguments > which can be presented agains naturalism. I'll take this as a further admission that explaining religious experiences does not require positing your god(s). > > > > [4.5 The Shyness Argument] > > > > [------------------------] > > > > do you dispute that the presumably recent vintage > > of this argument shows that theists have lost much of > > their confidence in their position since roughly a > > millenium ago? > > > Yes. I consider btw that I have demolished your > argument here. Only if by "demolish" you mean "ignore without response" (see my repeated "Either.." below) or "dispute without argument" (above). Not only are you losing the game, but you can't even keep score. :-) > > you must here admit that no philosophical "proof" > > of God's existence can be convincing, as such a proof > > would "compel belief". > > > Non sequitur. A *convincing* proof certainly doesn't > compel belief. Do you claim that if a philosophical proof of God's existence were as convincing as, say, the proof of the Four Color Theorem, then it would nevertheless not "compel belief"? If not, then what *would* "compel belief"? Again: Either first-hand witness of miracles (or an indisputably sound proof of God's existence) is an "imposition" of belief, or it is a non-imposing level of evidence whose denial to the rest of us is immoral (given the punishment for non-belief). > > Your cosmological argument from designed initial conditions > > I have rebutted elsewhere. > > > Please cut and paste your 'rebuttal' here. In the same posting I wrote the following (which you ignored): If by "maximally perfect" you imply the property of self-causing, then we can say that the universe itself is as likely to be self-causing as is any god. (Ontological arguments to the contrary simply confuse the notions of logical and ontological necessity.) If not, then SuperGod is needed to explain El/Yahweh. See also "Theism does not explain.." paragraph above, and this unrebutted Jun 27 posting in the JH Design Argument thread: > An argument for theism > such as the one I refer to above utilizes the notion of > a maximally perfect reality- that concept isn't open to the atheist. The parallel is that both argue that the existence of the universe is explainable once you grant either "maximally perfect reality" (whatever that is) or the necessary existence of logical possibility. > > Then please cut and paste your "answer". My search of the > > thread only produced your Jun 23 remark about "dances, > > computer programs, paintings etc". Is this your "design > > argument"? > > > I can re-present the argument if you want. Which part of "please cut and paste" do you not understand? > I would be happy to discuss the ontological argument , > or the argument from design- your choice. Design! I here repeat for a FOURTH time my invitation to talk design: > > Do you admit that, aside from the > > need for a first cause for the initial boundary > > conditions, all the apparent design > > in the universe can be explained without an intelligent > > designer? If not, please identify the relevant apparent > > design. > Suggestion: it might > be interesting to discuss the ontological argument, > as I have not discussed that at length before. We're already discussing it on the "Brian Holtz on Religion" thread, in case you haven't noticed. > > > We could in any case shave away any additional 'SuperGods' > > > with Ockham's razor. > > > > just as it shaves away the "creator-deity" in the first place. > > > Please present a supporting argument for this assertion. It's the same as whatever argument you have for the assertion that we could shave away additional 'SuperGods'. > > Aside from unconvincing ontological considerations, how are > > the conditions any different between positing the > > unexplained explanandum of a "creator deity" and the > > unexplained explanandum of the universe itself? > > > The explanation for a deity and a universe are not at the same > level, so Ockham' razor is not applicable. Redundant levels of explanation are *never* "at the same level", but economy of explanation nevertheless applies. > > > 1. Ceteris paribus conditions do not obtain in the present > > > context ( see above) > > > > quite irrelevant to the current > > discussion of your assertion "it is quite incorrect to suppose...". > > > Wrong. Your example above involves explanations at two > different levels My example above is not the issue right here. Here I am trying to get you to defend your assertion that It is quite incorrect to suppose that we ought to suppose the most parsimonious explanation is the correct one Your point above about different levels is irrelevant to this assertion (even though that point also happens to be wrong). > > Because without this principle, we have no way to choose > > between the usually-accepted (i.e. simplest) explanation > > and any of the infinitely many arbitrarily-convoluted > > conspiracy theories that can be tailored to fit the evidence > > just as well. > > > If I apply a notion of > simplicity to eliminate wildly complex explanations, it does > not follow that I must hold that the simpler of > two explanations must be true. I said: (not P) -> (not C). It's fallacious to assert that I am thus claiming C -> P. At any rate, I don't claim precisely that "the simpler of two explanations must be true"; I claim it ceteris paribus. Specifically: I claim that it is never the case that of explanations with equal explanatory power, equal logical consistency, and equal consistency with other truths, the most parsimonious is NOT the one considered correct or true. I challenge you (yet again) to produce a single counter-example. I also note that you did not dare disagree with my assertion that It's silly to claim that economy of explanation is only an ontological principle and has nothing to do with epistemology. > suppose you are seeking an attractive female- you > seek out women who are reasonably slim rather > than overweight, since you expect that > these will be more attractive. But it does not > follow from this that woman A who weighs a lb or > so more than woman B will be less attractive. If a slightly heavier woman is nevertheless more attractive than a slightly lighter one, then she must be more attractive for reasons other than your criterion of lightness, and so no ceteris paribus condition obtains. But my claim includes a ceteris paribus condition, and thus your analogy fails. -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net