Subject: Re: JH: The Design Argument Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2001 23:21:28 -0700 From: "Brian Holtz" To: "Brian Holtz" "Paul Filseth" wrote : > > > > > > The apparent fine-tuning implies that at least one of three > > > possibilities is probably the case: (a) that the fine-tuning is > > > only apparent, because physical principles we don't yet know about > > > make the values we observe more probable than they look, or > > > (b) that other sorts of intelligent beings than our sort -- beings > > > that aren't "life as we know it" -- are possible, or (c) that > > > there exists stuff in addition to the big bang debris we see, > > > stuff that isn't governed by the laws we know about. > > > a fine-tuner is an (a), and a (b), and a (c). It's > stuff that isn't governed by our laws, intelligent stuff, that makes > our sort of universe more probable. Since "fine-tuner" is a _subset_ > of the ways (a) might be the case, that means it's less likely -- it's > the same reason it's more likely that a European will win an Olympic > medal than that a German will. Likewise (b) and (c). I don't follow your reasoning here. Are you trying to classify the divine will and reasoning of a Designer (resulting in life being more likely) as simply "physical principles we don't yet know about"? If so, aren't you begging (or indeed conceding) the entire question of design to call this only "apparent" fine-tuning but an actual "physical principle"? If not, then how is a fine-tuner a subset of (a)? Are you saying that a (perhaps necessarily-existing) intelligent Designer is a valid counter-example to the claim that the universe appears fine-tuned to support precisely human-style intelligence? Wouldn't that be conceding that the Designer exists? > we have an abundance of possible reasons for the anthropic coincidences > that are all provably more likely than a fine-tuner. What are these possible reasons? How are they provably more likely? -- Brian.Holtz@sun.com Knowledge is dangerous. Take a risk: http://humanknowledge.net