Subject: Re: JH: The Design Argument Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2001 11:27:13 -0700 From: "Brian Holtz" To: "Paul Filseth" wrote : > "Brian Holtz" wrote: > > > Have attempted "supernatural" explanations (by hypothesis) > > > _succeeded_ during that period? [..] > > > Have they explained the event in a way that helps us understand > > > it, lets us predict its details, or unifies the phenomenon with > > > others? > > > > these criteria aren't mandatory for an > > explanation to be considered successful. For example, [..] > > quantum decay events are not completely understood in the > > sense of being fully predictable. And unification > > is of course famously lacking [with] relativity > > Quantum theory does not > purport to explain why a quantum decay event occurs when it does I didn't say it did. I merely pointed out that QT does not fully live up to your criteria of understanding and prediction, while it is nevertheless "successful". > If unification didn't > count as a criterion for explanation unless we unify every phenomenon > in the world in one shot, science couldn't get anywhere. Right, which is why you shouldn't hold my hypothetically successful supernatural explanation to an unreasonably high standard of "success". So what exactly did you mean by "unifies the phenomenon with others"? And to repeat my original question: by hypothesis all attempts to show that the phenomenon is due to some natural agency or process meet with failure. Surely after some period (10 years? 10,000 years?) of failed natural explanations, doesn't it become sensible to say that the "supernatural" explanation is "successful"? > > > is "goddidit" just as much an > > > untestable label for the unknown at the end of the 10,000 years > > > > ["goddidit"] is quite tested in the sense that it is 100% right in > > predicting when these miracles occur (i.e. whenever priests will > > them), while no natural theory can predict them at all. > > That's not a prediction. Father Jones announces that tomorrow he will perform miracle X. The hypothetical supernatural theory then produces the statement that tomorrow miracle X will happen, while the naturalist-mysterian theory is silent. The next day, miracle X happens. How is that not a prediction? Aw geez, are we now going to argue over the definition of "prediction"...? :-) > According to your scenario, _first_ we > observed that priests could make this happen, and _then_ people said > it was because goddidit. Newton first saw an apple fall, and then said gravity did it. Does that mean his theory of gravity makes no predictions? > > > > Are you saying that there is no conceivable case in which a deity > > > > exists and has observable consequences and is the best explanation > > > > for those consequences? > > > > > > Heck no So, to clarify, you agree that there is a conceivable case in which a deity exists and has observable consequences and is the best explanation for those consequences? If so, then what is it, and how is it different from my hypothetical miracle-working priest? > > > [but] The above [is] perfectly consistent with > > > there being one or more gods. > > > > Only if your notion of "being" is one that can apply to a thing > > even if there is no conceivable way for its consequences to support > > the belief that it exists. [B]eing the > > best explanation for observable consequences is what I would say > > fundamentally constitutes existing. [..] > > Otherwise, you could just as easily say that Santa Claus exists [..] > > Such a notion of being makes it hopelessly indeterminable. > > Yes. Some concepts don't support determination of their entire > extensions My point is not merely that all existents could not be enumerated, or that some corner cases would be hard to determine. My point is that such a notion of "being" makes it impossible to rebut the proposition that an arbitrary thing (e.g. Santa Claus) exists. > > Can you tell me what *is* standard usage [for "exists"]? > > Sure. I'll point out the concept it stands for when somebody > uses it. (I would expect such evasiveness from JH, but not you...) I'm not asking for instances, since they are everywhere (like "*is*" above or "are" in this sentence). I'm asking if you've got a better definition than the ones I've mentioned. > All dictionary definitions loop back on themselves at some point. > So go to primary sources. Observe the speech community using the > word. Lexicographers do that. > > > The only elements of non-circularity we find above are: verifiability, > > knowability, recognizability, understandability, presence in the > > universe, and concreteness/physicality. [..] > > If so, the lexicographers botched their job. So you disagree not only with my definition but also with those of all the lexicographers I could find? :-) And yet you're still sure that you have a different and better (but secret?) way to describe "standard usage"? :-) > You can't settle the immaterial-soul question by word games, > [such as] defining "exist" as requiring concreteness/physicality Right, which is why I propose to settle it by requiring causal relatedness. > > and seem to have explanatory utility only in slippery anthropic > > theories. > > If you regard the notion as useless, feel free not to use it. Do > not feel free to assume no one else uses it. I'm not saying they don't use it, I'm just saying (as you say about "supernatural") that they are confused when they use it. As you wrote: "I've noticed whenever people attempt to explain what they _mean_, by giving _criteria_ rather than examples, they fail". Is it perhaps fear of such failure that prevents you from telling us your own criteria for "exists"? :-) > > > then the inhabitants of each segment would have to call the > > > other "non-existent" > > > > Right. How could they otherwise? > > Very easily. By either (a) not taking a position on the matter, Then for all things (e.g. Santa Claus) that in standard usage are positively considered not to exist, this option would insted require merely not taking a position on their existence. > or (b) jumping to a correct conclusion not supported by evidence. Then for any thing (e.g. Santa Claus) that in standard usage is positively considered not to exist, this option would make that thing's existence irrefutable. > if they call the inhabitants of the other segment > "non-existent", they're making a false statement. Only because you stipulate that those inhabitants "exist" -- without saying what that means. :-) > > > "No non-interacting parallel universes exist" is an unfalsifiable > > > synthetic statement, and making it analytic by redefining "exist" > > > doesn't settle it > > > > A statement like that whose truth or falsity seemingly has no possible > > consequences is hard to consider as having any content whatsoever. > > George Orwell [called such a move] "Newspeak". All I'm doing here is invoking the Verifiability Principle, which in philosophy is called "positivism". Calling my move Orwellian is little more than an ad hominem. > > Your proposition is probably impossible to express without a > > question-begging appeal to the only-intuitively-defined notion > > of "exists". > > Possibly so. But when you brought up the many-worlds QM model > you proved you know what I'm talking about. You share the intuitive > notion I know what you *think* you're talking about (just as you've said you know how "supernatural" is used in ordinary language). But I'm also asserting that this "intuitive notion" is confused to the extent that it doesn't cash out as causal relatedness. > > I doubt there's a way to rephrase it that doesn't > > give parallel universes the same status as fictional universes. > > Our local segment of everything contains writers who cause events > in fictional universes, which in turn cause events in readers' minds. > How could causally disconnected parallel universes have the same status? Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist, but the the character of Sherlock Holmes does exist. The character of Sherlock Holmes has causal relations with existing things, but Sherlock Holmes does not. Sherlock Holmes has the same status as a parallel universe. > > or [Rick] has no defense against people who say (unparsimoniously) > > that Santa Claus exists and causes Christmas presents and also > > arranges it so that his existence is never the best explanation > > for Christmas presents. > > He can say "That's unfalsifiable." Then by what criteria could Rick ever assign anything to the category of (not existing) instead of to the category of (existing but can never be the best explanation for the evidence)? Indeed, how can he ever assign anything to the category of (existing) instead of to the category (not existing but is the best explanation for the evidence)? Operationally, he would have to use the paired categories inseparably. So by saying it is impossible for gods to be considered the best explanation, he would in effect be saying it is impossible for gods to exist. -- Brian.Holtz@sun.com Knowledge is dangerous. Take a risk: http://humanknowledge.net