Subject: Re: definitions of god, atheism, etc. Date: Sat, 11 Aug 2001 00:53:22 -0700 From: "Brian Holtz" To: "Paul Filseth" wrote: > > > a perfectly clear notion, but doesn't refer to the same > > > things people commonly use "supernatural" for. > > > Aquinas defined 'miracle' as things "done by divine agency beyond > > the order commonly observed in nature". > > I also note that Merriam-Webster's two definitions both (in their > > special cases) resonate with mine. > > I would not accuse Aquinas of circularity. Let's stick with your > definitions. Gladly, but I'm curious: do you agree that M-W's definitions resonate with mine? And if so, do you say that M-W too has deviated from common usage? > > My definition is now: "egregiously violative of the regularities > > that are usually observed in the material world, while also > > consistent with the expressed will of some agency." > > while unexplained phenomena like hydrogen bombs egregiously > violate regularities [..] in a way consistent with the > expressed will of Kaiser Wilhelm VII. Does that match either common > usage or your intuitive notion of "supernatural"? Since you stipulate that H-bombs would be unexplained to us, then yes they would appear to "depart from what is usual or normal especially so as to appear to transcend the laws of nature" [M-W 2a]. But they would not be "attributed to an invisible agent (as a ghost or spirit)" [M-W 2b], and so would seem supernatural more like witchcraft than like divinity. Still, the phenomenon would (to those not in the know) seemingly satisfy both my definition and M-W 2a. Now, how much are you trying to make of the fact that we can be wrong about the regularities we observe? Are you saying that because every past case of alleged supernaturality has turned out to be either natural or at least arguably subject to future natural explanation, that therefore it can never under any conceivable circumstances be reasonable to believe a supernatural explanation for any phenomenon? > "there might be something besides that subset > of the universe that interacts with us". You shouldn't use the present progressive indicative tense, but rather a future perfect subjunctive: "there might be something besides that subset of the universe that ever would have been able to interact with us". This is indeed analytically false by my definition of "be", and I note that the relevant "subset of the universe" is (by my definition) the universe itself. > If you're concluding nothing > outside the universe exists from the way you define "exists", that > doesn't matter since I didn't use the word. Sorry, but I take "be" and "exist" as synonyms here. :-) > (What's an LPU?) It's an abbreviation I've used for Logically Possible Universe. > Then there might be things that don't pd-exist. But under what definition of "be"? As I've said, I can't find one that doesn't make a question-begging appeal to intuition. > Pd-existence is a property. Yeah, and this might be a problem for me, since it's important in logic that existence not be a predicate. :-( Perhaps I should make a distinction between logical existence and ontological existence... > > If I had intended "as regular as a law", I obviously would have stuck > > with my original "laws governing" formulation. :-) > > You obviously wouldn't have, since "laws governing" didn't include > the "seem to" you needed. And "Laws that seem to govern" would have > been an odd way to use "laws". Only because you apparently take "law" to only apply to perfect egularities. But some laws (as in thermodynamics and quantum mechanics) are about imperfect regularities, though they of course can be converted into iron-clad laws simply by including in them the necessary statistical caveats. Such considerations -- and not epistemological ones -- were what I was driving at with "seem to". At any rate, do you now grok what I mean by "regularities that are usually observed"? I.e., roughly the laws that would be in force if no common-usage miracles were happening. > > we have no evidence for saying that an irreducible law *cannot* > > be violated -- unless you just want to define it that way. > > I'm just trying to figure out what you mean by "irreducible". I mean: not deducible from (i.e. strictly determined by) other more-basic laws. > > Energy conservation would still be irreducible in the sense > > that it cannot be derived deterministically or > > probabilistically from any other more-fundamental regularity. > > What's non-deterministic about "God wills that energy be > conserved in such-and-such a situation; God is omnipotent; therefore > the energy is conserved." Getting "physical principle X" from "God wills physical principle X" is hardly a reduction. But if you like, you could just take "God wills physical principle X" as the basic and irreducible law in question, since it cannot be derived from "God is omnipotent" or "God is omnibenevolent" or whatever. > The concept of a creator of a universe intervening in its > day-to-day operations is perfectly straightforward and interesting, > but if it happens it's a matter of physics and exobiology, not > metaphysics. Such intervention would mean that naturalism is false. Naturalism is considered (except perhaps by you :-) to be a metaphysical thesis. > > * If (what people commonly consider) miracles started happening > > then the physicists would treat it as just another > > Newtonian-to-Relativistic or classical-to-quantum paradigm > > generalization, and there would be no metaphysical implications. > > I can't say what real physicists would do I daresay I can in this case, and I'm happy at this point to just agree that we have startlingly different expectations about how serious thinkers would react to the hypothesized situation. I suspect your are in a minority (of roughly one :-), and at some point I have to stop investing in trying to persuade such a minority. If you could give some justification for your expectation, or name others who share it, then perhaps this point would merit more discussion. > > * If my hypothetical priestly energy non-conservation happened, > > people wouldn't be justified in saying that the centuries-old > > naturalism-vs-supernaturalism debate had been settled in favor > > of supernaturalism. > > Not until people saying that proposed an operational definition > of "supernatural" that matched common usage. Do you seriously doubt that most philosophers (and most people in general) would conclude that the debate had been settled in favor of something they call "supernaturalism"? [Here too the discussion approaches diminishing returns. :-( ] > If common-usage > souls, gods and miracles were shown to exist, but no substantive > difference between them and the stuff we're used to could be exhibited, > [..] If a substantive difference could be exhibited then I'd accept > "supernatural" as a name for that difference. [A glimmer of hope!] Would you consider it "substantive" if souls and gods were shown to be immaterial conscious agencies that were nevertheless able to influence the material world in ways that egregiously violate the regularities that it otherwise usually exhibits? If not, what precisely *would* constitute a "substantive" difference? What are your operational criteria for such a difference? > > > Can you give examples of what would be an egregious or > > > an unegregious willed violation of some pattern that's basic and > > > irreducible, yet only usually followed? > > > > Egregious: a priest at will violates mass-energy conservation. > > Unegregious: a priest prays to win a lottery (decided by a > > quantum decay event) and does. > > I meant an example where there's some comprehensible justification > for calling the violated patterns "irreducible". Mass-energy conservation (or more precisely, the invariance of the stress-energy tensor under displacement and rotation in spacetime) is basic and irreducible. That is, it is as far as we (or at least I) know a brute fact, and cannot be deduced from other more basic facts or principles. Or, if you prefer, the basic and irreducible (i.e. non-derivable) principle here is "God wills that by default mass-energy is conserved". > > The graviton is hypothesized to have spin ±2. I'm not sure how > > the expansive effect of vacuum energy relates to gauge bosons > > But we don't know only gravitons can interact with mass -- maybe > there's an odd spin boson we don't know about. Yes, the Usenet Relativity FAQ discusses this possibility under the topic of gravitational radiation. In my Futurology section I say that antigravity technology is only improbable rather than impossible. In the context of my census of the paranormal, antigravity and cold fusion and perpetual motion refer to the mad scientists who claim to have these things already working in in their garages (despite government and corporate suppression of their inventions). :-) -- Brian.Holtz@sun.com Knowledge is dangerous. Take a risk: http://humanknowledge.net