From: Brian Holtz [Brian.Holtz@sun.com] Sent: Saturday, September 01, 2001 12:28 AM To: Brian Holtz Subject: Re: definitions of god, atheism, etc. "Paul Filseth" wrote: > > do you agree that M-W's definitions > > resonate with mine? And if so, do you say that M-W too has > > deviated from common usage? > > If you want to debate M-W's definitions I want to debate your charge that my definition does not match common usage. I did so by showing that my definition pretty much synthesizes the non-circular aspects of all the dictionary definitions I could find. > > > > My definition is now: "egregiously violative of the regularities > > > > that are usually observed in the material world, while also > > > > consistent with the expressed will of some agency." > > > > > > while unexplained phenomena like hydrogen bombs egregiously > > > violate regularities [..] in a way consistent with the expressed > > > will of Kaiser Wilhelm VII. Does that match either common > > > usage or your intuitive notion of "supernatural"? > > > > Since you stipulate that H-bombs would be unexplained to us, > > then yes they would appear to "depart from what is usual or > > normal especially so as to appear to transcend the laws of > > nature" [M-W 2a]. But they would not be "attributed to an > > invisible agent (as a ghost or spirit)" [M-W 2b], and so > > would seem supernatural more like witchcraft than like divinity. > > This scenario would satisfy your definition (and perhaps > M-W 2a, depending on their definition of "law of nature"). It seems > obvious to me based on my experience with people that if this situation > had occurred, English speakers would not, by and large, call German > H-bombs "supernatural". It all depends on their perception of "usual or normal" and what they consider an "egregious" violation etc. > This refutes your definition. It doesn't match common usage. > We would not put [secret H-bomb technology] in the same category > with witches and deities. If so, then that is only because we would not judge that the bomb "transcends the laws of nature". If you stipulate that, then of course this scenario would _not_ satisfy either Mirriam-Webster's or my definitions. And here, on cue, is your stipulation: - What people would actually hypothesize is that he employed - scientists who understood physics better than everybody else. There is a difference between thinking something transcends the laws of nature and thinking that it shows one's understanding of those laws to be incomplete. Of course, your denial of this difference is the very heart of our disagreement. (Right?) > it can never be reasonable to > believe a cu-supernatural explanation, regardless of observation, > until there's a definition of "supernatural" that matches common usage > and clearly distinguishes the two categories. Merriam-Webster and I think that we have one, as apparently do all the authors in the philosophical literature who write as though the two categories are clearly distinguishable. Are you saying that there can be no possible definition of 'supernatural' that matches common usage and clearly distinguishes the two categories? If not, what would this definition be (or be like)? If so, why do philosophers use the term as if such a definition is possible (and indeed hardly in need of spelling out)? > _Of course_ there are no circumstances that would make it > reasonable to believe in violations of correct descriptions of the > world. Did you really think that I disagree with this point? What I disagree with is your apparent notion that whatever exists is by definition "natural" and not supernatural: que serra serra naturel. If the Christians are right, and you and I end up burning in adjacent cells in Hell, will you tell me that our situation is natural and not supernatural? :-) > > > "there might be something besides that subset > > > of the universe that interacts with us". > > > > You shouldn't use the present progressive indicative tense, > > but rather a future perfect subjunctive: "there might be something > > besides that subset of the universe that ever would have been > > able to interact with us". > > "Would have been able" _if what_? If anything. If the subjunctive tense isn't clear, I can restate it in the indicative: "there might be something besides that subset of the universe that will ever have had any possible ability to interact with us". > > This is indeed analytically false by my definition of "be" > > Well, it's true No, it isn't. :-) > so don't expect to stop people from [..] saying it Oh I don't. I just will continue to demonstrate that they are asking their vague intuitive understanding of "be" to carry a load that it can't bear. > > > And when people say existence isn't a property > > > they mean common-usage existence. Pd-existence is a property. > > > > Perhaps I should make a distinction between logical existence > > and ontological existence... > > Let me know if you want to bring a new definition into the arena. No need. Logical existence is probably already pretty well-defined using model theory, and is the one that is important not to define as a predicate. Ontological existence is a separate concept, and I don't see why it can't act as a predicate. > > by "regularities that are > > usually observed" [I mean] roughly the laws that would be in force > > if no common-usage miracles were happening. > > No common-usage miracles are happening. So that's the laws > that _are_ in force. Are you arguing that because miracles are not being observed they are therefore impossible? You can make such a case for mere nomological (i.e. physical) impossibility, but not for metaphysical or logical impossibility. > What's hard to see is how the concept maps into > a hypothetical world where common-usage miracles happen predictably. Do you mean "predictably" as in mechanically predictable, or as in predictable by asking the miracle-workers what miracles they will be performing? In the former case the events would by definition not be miracles. In the latter case, the mapping is probably pretty obvious to anyone who regularly uses the word "miracle". Are people who use this word just hopelessly confused? > > > The concept of a creator of a universe intervening in its > > > day-to-day operations is perfectly straightforward and interesting, > > > but if it happens it's a matter of physics and exobiology, not > > > metaphysics. > > > > Such intervention would mean that naturalism is false. > > I created an alife universe, and I intervened in it whenever I > pleased. [..] Will that convince you "naturalism" is false? Of course -- for that "universe", but not for _the_ universe. Here, allow me to expunge 'metaphysics' from my proposed statement of your position: * The common-usage concept of miracles is confused and, when properly understood, not useful for understanding the disagreement between people who say they believe in something they call the "supernatural" and people who do not believe in that something. > > > > * If (what people commonly consider) miracles started happening > > > > then the physicists would treat it as just another > > > > Newtonian-to-Relativistic or classical-to-quantum paradigm > > > > generalization, and there would be no metaphysical implications. > > > > > > I can't say what real physicists would do[, but logically > > > that's what it would be] > > > > I daresay I can in this case, and I'm happy at this point to just > > agree that we have startlingly different expectations about how > > serious thinkers would react to the hypothesized situation. I suspect > > your are in a minority (of roughly one :-), and at some > > point I have to stop investing in trying to persuade such a minority. > > You mean "declare victory and go home"? My point is precisely that it would _not_ be a "victory" because I would only have succeeded in identifying the set of people whose basic perception of reality makes them incorrigible (i.e. impossible to correct). > It's not me you have to either > deal with or fail to; it's logic. Suppose in every article JH repeated "no, the sky is green". If I ultimately gave up on trying to correct him, I'd not be bothered by his subsequent claim that "it's not me you have to either deal with or fail to; it's logic". :-) > Are you seriously suggesting that the merit of a position depends > on how many people agree with it? No, I'm seriously suggesting that the merit of me "investing in trying to persuade [..] a minority" depends on the size of that minority and the prima facie plausibility of its perceptions. > > Do you seriously doubt that most philosophers (and most people > > in general) would conclude that the debate had been settled in > > favor of something they call "supernaturalism"? > > [..] Why do you care so much what most people would conclude? Because we're debating whether my definition of "supernatural" matches common usage. > > Would you consider it "substantive" if souls > > and gods were shown to be immaterial conscious agencies that > > were nevertheless able to influence the material world in > > ways that egregiously violate the regularities that it > > otherwise usually exhibits? > > Sure. Mind you, if that were the case then supernaturalism would > not be a metaphysical thesis. Is this anything other than a restatement of your point that violations of "correct descriptions of the world" are impossible? I'm trying to come up with clear statements of those positions of yours that are in _disagreement_ with mine. Feel free to help. :-) Here's another try: * If my hypothetical priestly energy non-conservation happened, people wouldn't say that the centuries-old naturalism-vs-supernaturalism debate had been settled in favor of supernaturalism. > > Or, if you prefer, the basic and irreducible (i.e. non-derivable) > > principle here is "God wills that by default mass-energy is > > conserved". > > But that regularity isn't _violated_. Yes, "basic and irreducible" (i.e. non-derivable) should probably be limited in scope to non-derivability from other regularities that do not involved the exercise of conscious will. Is your point here to try to deny that miracles are a clear and non-oxymoronic notion? If so, you may want to read the article on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/miracles/ -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net