From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 8:17 AM To: alt.atheism.moderated Subject: Re: Science & atheism are cultures. "Paul Holbach" wrote: > > Are you claiming there can only be > > one actual world, and that no other possible worlds can be actual? > > is there any semantic difference between a logical world and a > logically possible world? Only if "logical world" can refer to a self-contradictory world. > logical possibility doesnīt entail ontological > possibility You've again confused ontological and nomological possibility. > some or even many of the logically possible worlds might be > actual This contradicts your earlier statement: To me possible worlds (except for the actual one) are worlds of imagination, ie logical phantasmata which are described realistically but whose content is irreal, ie non-actual. > Logical conceivability doesnīt entail the possibility of actual > existence. Yes it does. > > This definition is question-begging, unless you can define 'existent', > > 'fact', and 'not merely possible' without reference to each other > > (or of course to 'actual'). > > Well, every definition is in some sense "question-begging". But thatīs > simply the way language works. We couldnīt communicate with each other > in case every word or phrase led to an infinite regress Yes, but my definition regresses to concepts which are not in dispute, whereas your definition is simply a cycle of homonyms for the very concept which is in dispute. > > Unlike all of the above, my definition of actual/existent/real > > does not simply invoke a synonym. > > Lewisī narrow stipulation of "actual" as an indexical cannot ban the > common usage. Nobody is seeking to ban the use of all your homonyms. I am merely explaining to you what they all mean. By contrast, all you've done is say they all mean the same thing, while begging the question of what that meaning is. > We know that no pig has ever flown [ ..24 lines deleted..] Nothing you say here gives any evidence that you've grasped what I meant when I said: You are again confusing the issues of whether absolute impossibility obtains (tenselessly) and whether it is possible. > > 'actuality' has a domain > > of definition and worlds are outside that domain. > > The specific "domain of definition" embedded in modal realism is one > possible terminology but not necessarily the only possible one. Then please point to an alternative definition (as opposed to a homonym cycle!). > > describe the difference they think > > they've identified between 'actual' and merely-possible worlds. > > [..] we donīt even know whether the all-pervading, ineffable > *Tao* has the potential to bring forth various universes. [..] If the difference I asked about is described in the above, I sure can't find it. > logic is the formal aspect of a semiotically active mind. But logic binds all possible minds, and thus is mind-independent in this sense. > In almost every case I mean "nomologically possible" when I say > "ontologically possible" Then it might help if what you say matches what you mean... :-) > > But for any property F, isn't there a property that is the negation > > of F? How do you tell for any given property whether it is > > intrinsically "negative" or "positive"? > > Discerning whether a property is negative or positive is quite simple: > Negative adjectives are formed by prefixes such as [..] You can't possibly think you've answered my questions here, can you? > Here, "positive"&"negative" are merely formal characterizations which > have nothing to do with moral, technical or aesthetic evaluations or > intrinsic qualities I of course don't think that by 'negative/positive' you mean any kind of value judgement. By 'intrinsic' I mean inherent in the concept, and independent of the vocabulary of any particular language. > > To ontologically be is to have a causal relationship with this sentence. > > Sentences do have causal powers? They can engage in causal relationships, yes. For example, my sentence above is part of the causal web that led you to respond with your question here. > Do you believe in the existence of abstract entities? I'm a conceptualist, so yes. (Sigh. The realism-vs-nominalism debate is soooooo boring, because it is so obviously built on linguistic imprecisions. I'm convinced that everyone in this debate actually has the same underlying beliefs, and are just using certain words differently.) > For instance, I have just thought a sentence S that isnīt causally > related to your sentence at all! It is, indirectly. > To which objects as the extension of logical possibilities and to > which ones as the extension of ontological possibilities do you refer? Any and all such objects. (Have we again tripped over your confusion of 'ontological' and 'nomological'?) > If my premise "Nothing is the absence of all things." is true, then my > conclusion is a sequitur! Simply restating your argument does not make it any more convincing. > > And thus, "the way the world is" is independent of e.g. the > > existence or non-existence of enunciations/thoughts/statements/ > > performances about Nothingness. QED. > > Certainly; but the truth that there is a way the world is > mind-dependent since truth is a property of assertoric sentences. I see nothing about your "since" clause that would lead me to say that the way the world is is "mind-dependent" in any particular sense. Can you say *precisely* what sense you're using? > logic in the strict sense of the > word can indeed only apply if minds exist. So a billion years ago, when no minds had ever existed (assuming no alien intelligence), the principle of non-contradiction did not apply, and e.g. it could have been the case that in a particular set of circumstances the Sun both did and did not exist? Absurd. -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net