From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Monday, July 29, 2002 10:11 PM To: Alt.Atheism.Moderated Subject: Re: Science & atheism are cultures. "Paul Holbach" wrote: > If there is no domain, ie no world, Bzzt. I'm trying to define 'world', and you're USING the term to dispute my definition. You can only do so if you already have some candidate definition of it. So: what is that definition? > "A represents B" can only be true if both A and B exist. True for logical existence, but false for ontological existence. You again evince some tacit prior assumption about the ontological existence of the things that world models are to represent or correspond to. If we already knew what worlds were, we wouldn't need to define them. > the empty set can only be defined intensionally since there is > no nameable extension of the empty set! Huh? Here's how I extensionally define the domain set of the empty world: {}. Where's the problem here? > So you must explicitly state at least one proposition about > *the empty world*, and that one would be *Nothing exists, there being > no objects and no relations.*! No such proposition is in the (empty) proposition list of the empty world. You can make many such casual and informal observations about my model of the empty world -- "it's elegant", "it's short", "it's confusing" -- but none of them reveal a logical contradiction in it. > > ...it's ludicrous to claim that your stipulation creates a > > contradiction in the version of the definition that omits > > your stipulation. > > Itīs ludicrous to claim that what I claim is ludicrous. ;-) > BTW, do think that philosophy should be defined as the "stipulation > game"?! We stipulate differently, but you make the further positive claim that your stipulation somehow reveals a contradiction in my stipulation. If you don't want to defend your claim, that's fine by me. Simply re-asserting it makes you look silly, no matter how many smileys you put after your re-assertion. > > No, you're just naively assuming that worlds are something other > > than what they are said to be by the only rigorous definition > > on the table (i.e. mine). > > You claim that one can completely deforest a forest and preserve it! I reject your analogy. A world isn't like a forest; it's like a world-model. > an empty world (not to be mixed up with the > empty_world_model_domain_set!) is a world What is a 'world'? I've defined it rigorously; you haven't even tried. I can't take your statements seriously if they contain contentious terms that you don't even attempt to define. > > Bzzt. It's circularly to use 'worldly' in a definition of 'world'. > > Dropping 'worldly' leaves "a number of items", and it is only by > > your stipulation that this number could not be zero. > > This number cannot be zero because if there were absolutely nothing, Please tell me what you mean by the condition of "there were absolutely nothing". We're trying to define what that condition means, so you can't invoke it to dispute the definition! > a world IS a totality of objects and relations, and if ALL relations > and ALL objects are subtracted, then the ENTIRE world is subtracted > and doesnīt exist any more! Says you. This is nothing more than a repetition of your stipulation that "objects" means "1 or more objects". If the above is your formal definition of 'world', then we simply have different definitions, and all our disagreements up to this point can be resolved simply by clarifying whose definition of 'world' is being used. > You, however, believe that even if everything is subtracted > from a world thereīd still remain a world, yet empty, to which an > alleged empty world model can correspond. That assumption is > erroneous! Argument by (exclamatory) assertion. > Furthermore, you apparently favour a "mob-ist" view of > model theory but a "pouch-ist" view of worlds. I repeat: I reject your fallacious assumption that the concept 'world' must be either like a mob or like a pouch. It isn't like a mob or a pouch, it's like a model. (Specifically, it's that which corresponds to a model.) > Non-empty sets can be "constructed" both extensionally and > intensionally but the empty set can only be defined intensionally due > to it being zero-extensional. I don't see how this dubious distinction between set construction and set definition makes world domain sets necessarily non-empty. > > to establish a rigorous definition of 'world' that helps me > > think about possible worlds in general, and the most minimal > > (empty?) possible world in particular. > > If your model draft did work, it would establish a kind of an > ontological conception of *nothingness*. Sure, it would establish that bh-nothingness can exist -- just as ph-nothingness cannot. These assertions are probably not in dispute, and I've no interest in debating whether 'nothingness' should mean bh-nothingness vs. ph-nothingness. That's a problem for lexicographers, not philosophers. All I'm trying to do here is convince you that you've mistaken a definitional disagreement for a logical contradiction. > BTW, I see a shy question mark behind "empty". Does this mean that > Iīve at least managed to nourish your own doubts about the possibility > of an empty world...? No, it just means that I don't want to smuggle my answer into the statement of the question on the table. > If your "bh-empty-world" is not nothing but something What is your definition of 'nothing'? My definition of 'nothing' is the bh-empty-world. If you have some other way of defining 'nothing', I'd love to hear it. > > While some worlds may contain an > > object in their domain set that corresponds to the world itself, > > the empty world is not one of them. It violates the rules for > > defining a world to speak of a proposition in its proposition list > > as have a variable bound to something that is not in the domain set. > > No, there ainīt any "rules for defining a world" Iīve violated by my > objection. If you have some alternative way of defining a 'world', I'd love to hear it. Your objection violates the only rules (i.e. definition) on the table -- mine. > > You obviously have a preconceived notion of how nothingness > > should be conceived, even though you lack a rigorous definition > > of it. That sounds like a personal problem of yours, and not > > like a problem in my definition. :-) > > Iīm sorry, but you really appear to stubbornly shut your eyes to the > weak points of your model conception. I haven't "shut [my] eyes"; on the contrary, I've begged in every way I know how for you to explicitly state your definitions and preconceptions. But all you do is say things like "X is not nothing but something". I'm sorry, but I just don't know what that means, and my ignorance is not because my "eyes" are "shut". > > nomological possibility within a world would still be > > quite distinct from logical possibility -- and within the actual > > world (or the set of possible worlds with the same scientific laws > > as ours) is precisely the context in which "nomological possibility" > > is used. > > OK, as far as our world or worlds analogous to ours are concerned. Which is precisely as far as the phrase 'nomological possibility' is concerned. -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net