Philosophy 112
 
Arguments, Definitions, Views, Etc.
 
 
Ethics is the branch of philosophy that contains the following subfields.

a. Core Areas of Ethics:

1. Normative ethics proper – the search for a criterion of morally right actions.

2. Axiology – the search for a criterion of good and evil.

3. Virtue/vice theory – the search for a criterion of excellence and deficiency of character.

b. Other Areas of Ethics:
1. The semantics of ethics – the attempt to discover the meanings of the evaluative terms (‘right’, ‘good’, ‘virtue’, etc.) used in core areas of ethics.

2. The logic of ethics – the attempt to discover the logic of the central concepts of ethics.

3. The epistemology of ethics – the attempt to discover whether it is possible for people to have knowledge of ethical facts.

4. Moral psychology – the attempt to understand how people develop their ethical concepts and views.

5. Applied ethics – the attempt to apply general principles from core areas of ethics to specific issues, such as euthanasia or abortion.

6. Moralizing – the attempt to get other people to adopt your own views about ethics.

7. History of ethics – the attempt to understand what past thinkers in ethics have said.
 


 GR: An act, A, is morally right iff in doing A, A’s agent treats others as he or she would like to be treated by them.
 
 

10C: An act token, A, is morally right iff A does not violate any of the Ten Commandments.
 
 

An act token, A, is morally right iff _________.
 
 

C2 is a sufficient condition for rightness:
A satisfies C2  ?  A is morally right
 
 

C1 is a necessary condition for rightness:
A is a right act  ?  A satisfies C1
 
 

Act token A is morally obligatory =df it would not be morally right for A’s agent to fail to perform A.

Act token A is morally wrong =df it would not be morally right for A’s agent to perform A.
 
 

Act types: murders, donations to charity, lies, promise keepings.

Act tokens: Brutus’s murder of Caesar, John Wilkes Booth’s murder of Abraham Lincoln, Jack the Ripper’s murder of his first victim.
 
 Normative ethics proper – the search for a criterion of morally right actions.
 
FPNEB: The fundamental project of the normative ethics of behavior is the attempt to discover, properly formulate, and defend a criterion for the moral rightness of actions.
 
The Reformer’s Dilemma

(1)  If CR were true, then every moral reformer would be mistaken.
(2)  Not every moral reformer is mistaken.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3)  CR is not true.
 
 

An Argument for Cultural Relativism

(1)  Different societies have different moral codes.
(2)  If (1), then CR is true.
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3)  CR is true.
 
 

Cultural Relativism (CR): Act A is morally right iff A is permitted by the moral code of the society of A’s agent.
 
The Argument from Your Beliefs

(1) You believe that Hitler’s actions were morally wrong.
(2) If (1), then you are committed to the existence of moral wrongness.
(3) If you are committed to the existence of moral wrongness, then you are not really a Nihilist.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(4) You are not really a Nihilist.
 
 
The Argument from Disagreement

(1) If Nihilism were true, then there would be no genuine moral disagreements.
(2) There are some genuine moral disagreements.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) Nihilism is not true.
 
 
The Basic Argument Against Nihilism

(1) If Nihilism were true, then it would not be the case that Hitler’s actions were morally wrong.
(2) Hitler’s actions were morally wrong.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) Nihilism is not true.
 
 

Nihilism: (i) There are no such properties as moral rightness and moral wrongness. (ii) Nothing is objectively morally right or morally wrong. (iii) When someone says something like “A is morally right” (or “A is morally wrong”), what he or she really means is something like “I approve of A” (or “I disapprove of A”).
 
 
A Variation on Plato’s Argument Against DCT

(1) Either (a) God approves of morally right actions because of some intrinsic features possessed by those actions, or else (b) God approves of morally right actions independently of any intrinsic features of those actions.
(2) If (a), then DCT is false.
(3) If (b), then DCT is false.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(4) DCT is false.
 

Dilemma

Either P or Q
If P then R
If Q then R
––––––––––––
R
 
 
 
 
 
 

(Q) Why does God approve of morally right actions?

(A1) Because of some intrinsic features of those actions.

(A2) Not because of any intrinsic features of those actions.
 
 

Divine Command Theory (DCT): If an act is morally right, then it is morally right because of God’s approving of it, and if an act is morally wrong, then it is morally wrong because of God’s disapproving of it.
 
 

Preliminary Formulation of Divine Command Theory (PFDCT): An act, A, is morally right iff God approves of A.
 
 
Act              Hedons            Dolorons              Hedonic utility

Save kid            100                      18                             + 82
Eat ice cream        2                    123                            - 121
Calculate util’s      1                    123                            - 122
 
 
 
The “No Time to Calculate” Objection to HU
 
(1) HU entails that we should always calculate hedonic utilities before acting.
(2) It’s not the case that we should always calculate hedonic utilities before acting.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) HU is not true.
 
 
 
The “Too High for Humanity” Objection to HU

(1) HU entails that we should should always act selflessly and out of a desire to improve the world.
(2) It’s not the case that we should should always act selflessly and out of a desire to improve the world.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) HU is not true.
 
 
 
The “Doctrine of Swine” Objection to HU
 
(1) HU entails that we should always indulge ourselves in animalistic pleasures.
(2) It’s not the case that we should always indulge ourselves in animalistic pleasures.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) HU is not true.
 
 

The hedonic utility of an act, A, =df the total number of hedons that would result from A’s being performed minus the total number of dolorons that would result from A’s being performed.
 
Act A maximizes hedonic utility =df no alternative to A has a higher hedonic utility than A.
 
Hedonistic Utilitarianism (HU): An act, A, is morally right iff A maximizes hedonic utility.
 
 
 
 

Act                   Hedons             Dolorons        Hedonic utility

Save kid                 100                        18                      + 82
Eat ice cream             2                      123                     - 121
 
 
 
Generic Utilities in the Organ Shortage Case

Act                       Good                  Bad                Generic utility

Harvest organs     1,500                9,000                           - 7,500

Business as              400                1,500                           - 1,100
usual
 
 
 
The generic utility of an act, A, =df the total amount of good that would result from A’s being performed minus the total amount of bad that would result from A’s being performed.
 
Act A maximizes generic utility =df no alternative to A has a higher generic utility than A.
 
Generic Utilitarianism (GU): An act, A, is morally right iff A maximizes generic utility.
 
 

The Argument from Justice Against HU

(1) HU entails that it would be morally right to harvest the organs in the organ shortage case.
(2) It would not be morally right to harvest the organs in the organ shortage case.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) HU is not true.
 
 

Hedonic Utilities in the Organ Shortage Case

Act    Hedons Dolorons  Hedonic utility

Harvest organs     1,000          200   + 800

Business as         200       1,000    - 800
usual
 
 The hedonic utility of an act, A, =df the total number of hedons that would result from A’s being performed minus the total number of dolorons that would result from A’s being performed.
 
Act A maximizes hedonic utility =df no alternative to A has a higher hedonic utility than A.
 
Hedonistic Utilitarianism (HU): An act, A, is morally right iff A maximizes hedonic utility.
 
 GR: An act, A, is morally right iff in doing A, A’s agent treats others as he or she would like to be treated by them.
 
 

M6: Whenever I can maximize hedonic utility by sacrificing some innocent person, then I will do so.
 
 
 
The Categorical Imperative (CI): An act, A, is morally right iff it would be rational to want the maxim of A to be a universal law.
 
 

M5: Whenever I need money, I will go jump in a lake.
 
 

M3: Whenever I can enhance my business by giving correct change, I will do so.
 
M4: Whenever I owe someone a certain amount of money in change, I will give him or her that amount.
 
M2: Whenever I need a phone number from the phone book, I will rip out the page with the relevant listing.
 
 

M1: Whenever I need a loan that I would be unable to repay, I will borrow some money.
 
 

Kant’s Axiological Theory (KAT): The only thing that is intrinsically good is a good will.
 
 

The Practical Imperative (PI): Any act that involves treating a rational being as a means only is morally wrong.
 
 Ross’s Theory (RT): An act, A, is morally right iff (i) A’s agent has some prima facie duty (or duties) to perform A, and (ii) that prima facie duty is not (or those prima facie duties are not) overriden by some other prima facie duty or duties.
 
 
Ross’s Seven Types of Prima Facie Duty

1. Duties of fidelity
2. Duties of reparation
3. Duties of gratitude
4. Duties of justice
5. Duties of beneficence
6. Duties of self-improvement
7. Duties of non-maleficence
 
 

M9: When I receive a direct command from God, I will obey God’s orders.
 

M7: When the market gets to 12,000, I will sell all my stocks.

M8: When choosing a career, I will choose not to become a doctor.
 
 
1. Write an essay in which you (i) compare and contrast Rachels’s version of Cultural Relativism (CR) with the version presented in class, and (ii) present, explain, and evaluate The Reformer’s Dilemma (as an argument against the version of CR presented in class, that is).
 
2. Write an essay in which you (i) formulate and explain Nihilism, (ii) present, explain and evaluate what you take to be the best argument against Nihilism, (iii) formulate and explain Divine Command Theory (DCT), and (iv) present, explain, and evaluate A Variation on Plato’s Argument Against DCT.
 
3. Write an essay in which you (i) formulate and explain Hedonistic Utilitarianism (HU), (ii) present, explain, and evaluate The Argument from Justice Against HU, (iii) formulate and explain Generic Utilitarianism (GU), and (iv) present, explain, and evaluate what you take to be the best argument against GU.
 
4. Write an essay in which you (i) formulate and explain what you take to be Kant’s theory concerning the normative ethics of behavior, and (ii) present, explain, and evaluate what you take to be the best argument against that theory.
 
5. Write an essay in which you (i) formulate and explain what you take to be Ross’s theory concerning the normative ethics of behavior, and (ii) present, explain, and evaluate what you take to be the best argument against that theory.
 
 
Consumerism: (i) The possession of consumer goods is intrinsically good, and nothing else is in the same way intrinsically good. (ii) One life, L1, is intrinsically better than another life, L2, iff L1 contains a greater possession of consumer goods than L2. (iii) Similarly with possible worlds.
 
 

A Principle About Intrinsic Value (PAIV): The intrinsic value of a thing, x, is the result of subtracting the total amount of intrinsic badness x contains from the total amount of intrinsic goodness it contains.
 
 

x is intrinsically bad =df x is bad in itself; x has a kind of badness that it would continue to have even if it did not lead to any other bad things.

x is extrinsically bad =df x is bad because it leads to other bad things; x has a kind of badness that it would not continue to have if it did not lead to any other bad things.
 
 

 x is intrinsically good =df x is good in itself; x has a kind of goodness that it would continue to have even if it did not lead to any other good things.

x is extrinsically good =df x is good because it leads to other good things; x has a kind of goodness that it would not continue to have if it did not lead to any other good things.
 
 

The Argument from Evil

(1) If there were a God, then this would be the best possible world.
(2) This is not the best possible world.
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) There is no God.
 
 

FPA: The fundamental project of axiology is the attempt to discover, properly formulate, and defend principles determining the intrinsic values of various things including lives, outcomes, and possible worlds.
 
 

FPNEB: The fundamental project of the normative ethics of behavior is the attempt to discover, properly formulate, and defend a criterion for the moral rightness of actions.
 



 
(i) Every episode of pleasure is intrinsically good; every episode of pain is intrinsically bad.
 
(ii) The intrinsic value of an episode of pleasure, e = the number of hedons contained in e. The intrinsic value of an episode of pain, e = - (the number of dolorons contained in e).
 
(iii) The intrinsic value of a complex thing = the sum of the intrinsic values of all the episodes of pleasure and pain contained in that thing.
 
Simple Sensory Hedonism (SSH): (i) Every episode of pleasure is intrinsically good; every episode of pain is intrinsically bad. (ii) The intrinsic value of an episode of pleasure, e = the number of hedons contained in e. The intrinsic value of an episode of pain, e = - (the number of dolorons contained in e). (iii) The intrinsic value of a complex thing = the sum of the intrinsic values of all the episodes of pleasure and pain contained in that thing.
 
… if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means to happiness … [then] these are the only things desirable. (Mill, p. 39)
 
Psychological Hedonism (PH): Every person is ultimately motivated only by the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain.
 
The Argument from PH
 
(1) PH is true.
(2) If PH is true, then SSH is true.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) SSH is true.
 
 


 
Plato’s Oyster Argument Against SSH

(1) If SSH is true, then a person who lives like a contented oyster has a fabulously good life.
(2) A person who lives like a contented oyster does not have a fabulously good life.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) SSH is not true.
 
E1 = Jack the Ripper enjoying 100 hedons of pleasure as a result of killing one of his victims.
 
E2 = Mother Theresa’s enjoying 100 hedons of pleasure as a result of helping a deserving person in need.
 
The Argument from Jack the Ripper Against SSH
 
(1) If SSH is true, then E1 is just as intrinsically valuable as E2.
(2) E1 is not just as intrinsically valuable as E2.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) SSH is not true.
 
I(e) = the intensity of episode of pleasure e

D(e) = the duration of episode of pleasure e
 
Q(e) = the quality of episode of pleasure e
 
The number of qualified hedons in an episode, e, of pleasure =df I(e) X D(e) X Q(e).
 
Mill’s Qualified Hedonism (MQH): (i) Every episode of pleasure is intrinsically good; every episode of pain is intrinsically bad. (ii) The intrinsic value of an episode of pleasure, e = the number of qualified hedons contained in e. The intrinsic value of an episode of pain, e = - (the number of dolorons contained in e). (iii) The intrinsic value of a complex thing = the sum of the intrinsic values of all the episodes of pleasure and pain contained in that thing.
 
Plato’s Oyster Argument Against MQH

(1) If MQH is true, then a person who lives like a contented oyster has a fabulously good life.
(2) A person who lives like a contented oyster does not have a fabulously good life.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) MQH is not true.
 
The Argument from Jack the Ripper Against MQH

(1) If MQH were true, then E1 is just as intrinsically valuable as E2.
(2) E1 is not just as intrinsically valuable as E2.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) MQH is not true.
 
A New Oyster Argument Against MQH

(1) If MQH is true, then a person who lived like a contented oyster for a sufficiently long time would have a better life than Mill.
(2) It’s not the case that a person who lived like a contented oyster for a sufficiently long time would have a better life than Mill.
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) MQH is not true.
 



 
P1 = the proposition that Ned is eating ice cream
 
S’s desire for P is satisfied =df S desires that P be the case, and P is the case.
 
S’s desire for P is frustrated =df S desires that P be the case, but P is not the case.
 
Desire Satisfactionism (DS): (i) Every case of desire satisfaction is intrinsically good; every case of desire frustration is intrinsically bad. (ii) If a desire is satisfied, then the intrinsic value of that satisfaction is equal to the intensity of the desire satisfied; if a desire is frustrated, then the intrinsic value of that frustration is equal to - (the intensity of the desire frustrated). (iii) The intrinsic value of a complex thing is equal to the sum of the intrinsic values of all the desire satisfactions and frustrations that occur in that thing.
 
The Mad Max Argument Against DS
 
(1) Mad Max’s life is not a very good one.
(2) If (1), then DS is false.
 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(3) DS is false.
 
S’s desire for P is rational =df any rational and informed person in S’s situation would desire P.
 
Rational Desire Satisfactionism (RDS): (i) Every case of a rational desire being satisfied is intrinsically good; every case of a rational desire being frustrated is intrinsically bad. (ii) If a rational desire is satisfied, then the intrinsic value of that satisfaction is equal to the intensity of the desire satisfied; if a rational desire is frustrated, then the intrinsic value of that frustration is equal to - (the intensity of the desire frustrated). (iii) The intrinsic value of a complex thing is equal to the sum of the intrinsic values of all the rational desire satisfactions and frustrations that occur in that thing.
 
 


 
Action A is virtuous =df the motive behind A is commendable.
 
Action A is vicious =df the motive behind A is reprehensible.
 
Disposition D is virtuous =df D is a disposition to act from a commendable motive.
 
Disposition D is vicious =df D is a disposition to act from a reprehensible motive.
 
Apportionment A of pleasure and pain is just =df A gives pleasure to virtuous people (in proportion to how virtuous they are) and pain to vicious people (in proportion to how vicious they are).
 
 
Belief Degree of justification Intrinsic value
True .9 .9
False .9 - (1 - .9) = - .1
False .1 - (1 - .1) = - .9
 
Ross’s Pluralistic Axiology (RPA):
 
(i) Four kinds of thing are intrinsically good:
Four kinds of thing are intrinsically bad:
  • vicious dispositions and actions,
  • episodes of pain,
  • unjust apportionments of pleasure and pain, and
  • false beliefs.
  • (ii) Intrinsic values are determined as follows.
  • The intrinsic value of a disposition or action is equal to degree of commendability of the relevant motive.
  • The intrinsic value of an episode of pleasure or pain is equal to the hedonic or doloric value of that episode.
  • The intrinsic value of an apportionment of pleasure and pain is equal to the degree of justice of that apportionment.
  • The intrinsic value of a true belief is equal to the degree of justification of that belief, and the intrinsic value of a false belief is equal to - (1- the degree of justification of that belief).
  • (iii) The intrinsic value of a complex thing is equal to the sum of the intrinsic values of all the intrinsically valuable things that occur in that complex thing.
     
     


     
    a. Core Areas of Ethics:
    1. Normative ethics proper – the search for a criterion of morally right actions.

    2. Axiology – the search for a criterion of good and evil.

    3. Virtue/vice theory – the search for a criterion of excellence and deficiency of character.

    b. Other Areas of Ethics:
    1. The semantics of ethics – the attempt to discover the meanings of the evaluative terms (‘right’, ‘good’, ‘virtue’, etc.) used in core areas of ethics.

    2. The logic of ethics – the attempt to discover the logic of the central concepts of ethics.

    3. The epistemology of ethics – the attempt to discover whether it is possible for people to have knowledge of ethical facts.

    4. Moral psychology – the attempt to understand how people develop their ethical concepts and views.

    5. Applied ethics – the attempt to apply general principles from core areas of ethics to specific issues, such as euthanasia or abortion.

    6. Moralizing – the attempt to get other people to adopt your own views about ethics.

    7. History of ethics – the attempt to understand what past thinkers in ethics have said.
     

    What are the virtues? I.e., what traits makes someone a good person?
     
    What are the vices? I.e., what traits make someone a bad person?
     
    What makes it true that one person is a better person than another?
     
    The virtues according to Uncle Lester: Courage, Loyalty, Obedience, Patriotism, Discipline, Reverence.
     
    The virtues according to the Boy Scouts of America: Trustworthiness, Loyalty, Helpfulness, Friendliness, Courtesy, Kindness, Obedience, Cheerfulness, Thrift, Bravery, Cleanliness, Reverence.
     
    The virtues according to Plato: Courage, Wisdom, Temperance, Justice.
     
    The “moral” virtues according to Aristotle: Courage, Temperance, Liberality, Magnificence, Pride, Ambition, Good Temper, Friendliness, Truthfulness, Ready Wit, Justice.
     
    The “intellectual” virtues according to Aristotle: Science, Art, Practical Wisdom, Intuitive Reason, Philosophical Wisdom, Understanding, Judgment.
     
    The “natural” virtues according to Aquinas: Temperance, Courage, Justice, Prudence.
     
    The “theological” virtues according to Aquinas: Faith, Hope, Charity.
     
    Some further virtues according to pop culture: Benevolence, Chastity, Humility, Patience, Loyalty, etc.
     
    What makes a characteristic be a virtue?
     
    What makes a characteristic be a vice?
     
    FPVVT: The fundamental projects of virtue/vice theory are (a) the attempt to discover, properly formulate, and defend criteria of virtues and vices, and (b) the attempt to use these criteria to identify the virtues and vices.
     
    V1: Characteristic C is a virtue iff _____________.

    V2: Characteristic C is a vice iff _____________.
     
    VV: An act, A, is morally right iff A is precisely what a fully virtuous person would have done in the same circumstances.
     



     
    DC1: x is courageous =df x does not run away, but remains at his post and fights against the enemy.
     
    DC2: x is courageous =df x has endurance of the soul.
     
    DC3: x is courageous =df x has a wise endurance of the soul.
     
    DC4: x is courageous =df x is wise about things that inspire fear and confidence.
     
    DC5: x is courageous =df x is wise about future goods and evils.
     
    DC6: x is courageous =df x is wise about goods and evils.
     
    DW6: x is wise =df x is wise about goods and evils.
     
    DT6: x is temperate =df x is wise about goods and evils.
     
    DJ6: x is just =df x is wise about goods and evils.
     
    The Socratic Criterion of Virtue (SCV): Characteristic C is a virtue iff C is wisdom about goods and evils.
     
    Q1: Is there really just one virtue, or are there many?
     
    Q2: Is it possible to have some of the virtues while lacking others, or do they come as a package?
     
    Q3: How is the possession of virtue related to morally right behavior?
     
    Q4: How does one come to have a virtue? Can they be taught? Can they be acquired?
     
    Q5: Are you invariably better off as a result of being virtuous?
     
    Q6: Are you better off if everyone else is virtuous?
     
    The Socratic Theory of Virtue (STV): (i) There really is just one virtue: wisdom about goods and evils. It goes by different names in different situations. (ii) “The virtues” come as a package. (iii) A completely virtuous person will always do the right thing. (iv) Virtue can be taught and learned. (v) You are invariably better off as a result of being virtuous. (vi) You are better off if everyone else is virtuous.
     
    Aristotle’s Argument Against STV
     
    (1) Morally weak people have knowledge of good and evil but lack certain virtues.
    (2) If (1), then virtue involves more than mere knowledge of good and evil.
    (3) If virtue involves more than mere knowledge of good and evil, then STV is false.
     ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
    (4) STV is false.
     


     
    S has practical wisdom =df S knows what things are good for people, and also knows the best means of achieving those things.
     
    Aristotle’s Criterion of Virtue (ACV): Disposition D is a virtue iff D is a disposition to choose acts or emotions in the mean with respect to a particular family of acts or emotions.
     
     
    Act/Emotion Family Vice of Deficiency Virtue Vice of Excess
    Feelings Inspired by Danger Cowardliness Courage Rashness
    Opinions of Oneself Humility Pride Vanity
    Enjoying Pleasure Insensibility Temperance  Intemperance
    Taking Pleasure in Amusements  Boorishness Wittiness Buffoonery
    Giving to the Needy Cheapness Charity Prodigality
    Distributing Goods & Evils Giving People Less Than They Deserve Justice Giving People More Than They Deserve
     
    Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue (ATV): (i) Since each virtue is a disposition to choose acts or emotions in the mean with respect to a particular family of acts or emotions, there are as many virtues as there are relevant act/emotion families. (ii) It is theoretically possible to have some of the virtues while lacking others. (iii) If a person has all the virtues, then he or she will always behave correctly. (iv) Virtues can be acquired, but only by acquiring the right dispositions or habits. (v) You are invariably better off as a result of being virtuous. (vi) You are better off if everyone else is virtuous.
     


     
    x is intrinsically good =df x is good in itself; x has a kind of goodness that it would continue to have even if it did not lead to any other good things.
     
    x is extrinsically good =df x is good because it leads to other good things; x has a kind of goodness that it would not continue to have if it did not lead to any other good things.
     
    Preliminary Formulation of Moore’s Criterion of Virtue (PFMCV): Disposition D is a virtue iff (i) D is a disposition to behavior, and (ii) D is extrinsically better than any alternative disposition.
     
    Moore’s Criterion of Virtue (MCV): Disposition D is a virtue iff (i) D is a disposition to behavior, (ii) D is extrinsically better than any alternative disposition, and (iii) it is particularly useful to praise D.
     
    Moore’s Theory of Virtue (MTV): (i) Since virtues are extrinsically good dispositions to behavior that it is useful to praise, there are as many virtues as there are such dispositions. (ii) It is possible to have some virtues while lacking others. (iii) Virtuous people tend to perform morally right actions. (iv) Virtues can be acquired, but only by acquiring the right dispositions. (v) You are not necessarily better off as a result of your being virtuous (but the world is). (vi) You are better off if everyone else is virtuous.
     
    Moore’s Argument for MTV
     
    (1) Virtues are dispositions that are good but not intrinsically good.
    (2) If (1), then virtues are dispositions that are extrinsically good.
    (3) If virtues are dispositions that are extrinsically good, then MTV is true.
     –––––––––––––––––––––––––––
    (4) MTV is true.
     


     
    Wolf’s First Definition of Moral Sainthood (MS1): x is a moral saint =df every action x performs is as morally good as possible.
     
     
    Wolf’s Second Definition of Moral Sainthood (MS2): x is a moral saint =df x is as morally worthy as it is possible to be.
     
     
    The Inferiority of Moral Saints (IMS): A moral saint could not be the best kind of person possible.
     
     
    Wolf’s Argument from Blandness for IMS
     
    (1) A moral saint could not be offensive in any way.
    (2) If (1), then a moral saint would have to be dull-witted or humorless or bland.
    (3) If a moral saint would have to be dull-witted or humorless or bland, then a moral saint could not be the best kind of person possible.
     ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
    (4) A moral saint could not be the best kind of person possible.
     
     
    x is a moral fanatic =df x pursues his or her desire to be morally excellent despite any other desires he or she might have.
     
     
    Wolf’s Argument from Fanaticism for IMS
     
    (1) A moral saint would have to be a moral fanatic.
    (2) A moral fanatic would have to have a desire to be morally good that subsumes all other desires.
    (3) If (1) and (2), then a moral saint could not be the best kind of person possible.
     ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
    (4) A moral saint could not be the best kind of person possible.
     
     
    x is a Loving Saint =df x is a moral saint who is motivated by a love for other people.
     
     
    x is a Rational Saint =df x is a moral saint who is motivated by a sense of duty.
     
     
    Wolf’s Dilemma Argument for IMS
     
    (1) A moral saint would have to be either a Loving Saint or else a Rational Saint.
    (2) A Loving Saint would have to lack any appreciation of certain good things, like ice cream.
    (3) A Rational Saint would have to have a pathological fear of damnation or else an extreme form of self-hatred.
    (4) If (1)-(3), then a moral saint could not be the best kind of person possible.
     ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
    (5) A moral saint could not be the best kind of person possible.
     
     
    Wolf’s Main Argument for IMS
     
    (1) A moral saint would have to lack certain virtues.
    (2) If (1), then a moral saint could not be the best kind of person possible.
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    (3) A moral saint could not be the best kind of person possible.
     
     
    The Argument from Annoyance for IMS

    (1) A moral saint would have to be a very annoying person.
    (2) If (1), then a moral saint could not be the best kind of person possible.
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    (3) A moral saint could not be the best kind of person possible.
     



     
    Ethics is the branch of philosophy that contains the following subfields.
    Core Areas of Ethics
     

     
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