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Those who do not care for philosophy, but engage in ordinary studies are like the suitors, who wanted Penelope, but slept with her handmaids. (Gnomologium Vaticanum 743 n.166)
-- Gorgias
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| Author | Robert Adam's Indifference Objection to Lewis' Modal Realism |
sordavie
moderator
Posts: 1354 Posted:
Oct 18, 2004 - 02:53 PM
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The Road to Indifference
Lewis’ response to Robert Adams’ objection that we ought to be indifferent to this-worldly evils:
“Wanting to live is not like wanting that a kind of thing happen, somewhere in the worlds and never mind where; it is an egocentric-want, a want that I myself should have a certain property. The appropriate way to give the content of my desire is not by a condition that I want the entire system of worlds to satisfy, but by a condition that I want myself to satisfy. It is futile to want the entire system of worlds to satisfy a condition, because it is not contingent what conditions the entire system of worlds does or doesn’t satisfy…. It will not matter to reality as a whole how you decide – there will in any case be many just like you who decide one way and many who decide the other – but it still matters to you.” (Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds p. 125)
If we take ‘wanting to be good rather than evil’ as an egocentric-want, we see that Lewis responds by denying Adams one of his main premises.
Adams’ argument might be put as follows:
1. We strongly disapprove of deliberate actions that increase the total amount of evil; and generally, we are concerned about how we act and try to choose good acts over bad acts in order to minimize the total amount of evil there is.
2. The indexical theory of actuality has it that all worlds are of the same kind, and what is possible at our world is what is actual at some other world. Thus the totality of logical space is covered over the plurality of possible worlds.
3. By 2, every possible evil is an actual evil at some world or other, so there is no sense is saying that choosing certain acts over other acts will cause the total amount of evil to increase or decrease.
4. So by 3, since every possible evil and every possible good are actual at some world or other, there is no sense in being concerned about the way we act (because there’s no sense in which our actions change the total amount of evil there is).
5. Therefore, by 1 and 4, we should be indifferent about this-worldly evils because none of them will increase the net amount of evils there are.
Lewis denies the first premise. Our behavior is strongly linked to our wants and desires and that our wants and desires are mostly egocentric. We most care about those things that directly affect us – not the entire plurality of worlds. Wanting other worlds to be other wise is nothing but an idle wish, but wanting, de se, of ourselves, not to be the causal source of evils is not. The problem with the Adams objection is that we are really only concerned about our moral conduct to the extent that we are causally responsible for it. He relies on a premise that has too broad a scope for our worries.
However, the Lewis roadblock on the road to indifference may lead us to incoherence. In replying to the Adams object, Lewis tells us that our moral concerns are mostly egocentric; that is, we desire to be the causal source of good and not the causal source of evil. Further, we are not, and should not, be concerned about the moral characters of other worlds. If this is true and causation relies on a counterfactual analysis involving similarity relations to other-worldly counterparts, then Lewis’ theory is inconsistent.
In Counterfactuals, Lewis analyzes the sentence if A were true then B would be true as: C is true at the closest A world (where closeness is a suitable similarity relation). One plausible counterfactual analysis of causation says event C causes event E if and only if E counterfactually depends on C (i.e., if C hadn’t happened, then E wouldn’t have happened). Put in other words, C causes E if and only if the closest world where C doesn’t happen is also a world where E doesn’t happen. Given the counterfactual analysis of causation, in deliberating about which actions to take, while keeping our egocentric concern about not wanting to be causal sources of evil, we should think that counterfactuals come into play.
If the above is so, then we should have other-worldly concerns; namely, we should be concerned about the consequences of different possible courses of action open to us. We should be concerned about which possible world we will be in, in acting a certain way; and all of this requires being concerned about the way in which other, similar, possible worlds are. It requires being concerned about the way in which our counterparts are. Suppose I have a choice between doing an action C and not doing it. What I might ask myself is whether or not E counterfactually depends upon C. In wondering about this I wonder about close worlds where C wouldn’t be true and try to decide if in those worlds E also wouldn’t be true. Or in thinking about my own possible courses of action, I think about counterparts who complete those different courses of action and wonder whether or not their acts were causal sources of good or bad.
According to Lewis, one of our egocentric concerns is not to be the causal source of evil; but that concern, on the counterfactual analysis of causation, is a concern about my counterparts in other worlds – whether or not they will be causal sources of evil – so cannot be an egocentric concern at all. So Lewis’ reply to Adams seems inconsistent or contradictory.
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DanielFB
noesis
Posts: 190Posted:
Oct 18, 2004 - 07:48 PM |
Man seems to strive for autonomy and i suspect that both Lewis and Adams were trying their hardest to avoid relying on their emotions, however, both of succeeded in failing this and lied to everybody by telling the world how openness reads. What these two utter sheep don't realise is that in order to avoid hypocrisy, they have to lie. When they pointed out that man dissaproves of behaviour that causes evil, they were foolish in simply assuming that to be the case. It is like saying that all sales people are honest. It is not the case. Some sales people are obsessed by cats. | | |
sordavie
moderator
Posts: 1354Posted:
Oct 19, 2004 - 12:03 AM |
Quote:
| Man seems to strive for autonomy and i suspect that both Lewis and Adams were trying their hardest to avoid relying on their emotions, however, both of succeeded in failing this and lied to everybody by telling the world how openness reads. What these two utter sheep don't realise is that in order to avoid hypocrisy, they have to lie. When they pointed out that man dissaproves of behaviour that causes evil, they were foolish in simply assuming that to be the case. It is like saying that all sales people are honest. It is not the case. Some sales people are obsessed by cats. |
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Thank you for showing us that you didn't comprehend a word of my post.  | | |
Didymus
moderator
Posts: 740Posted:
Oct 19, 2004 - 02:41 AM |
The wonderful thing about Dan is that he makes me less afraid to ask my stupid questions, because no matter how dumb they are, they can't be as bad as Dan's. Thank you DanielFB, you give me courage!
So, here's my question: Is Adams's objection really merely a pragmatic point? Almost an Appeal to Wishful Thinking? Something like:
1. If Extreme Modal Realism is true, our ethical motivation is screwed.
2. It would be a bad, bad thing if our ethical motivation was screwed.
Therefore,
3. (We should believe that) Extreme Modal Realism is false.
--which, of course, isn't a real objection to a metaphysical position at all!
But that can't be right, because Bob Adams is a lot smarter than that. So where does this uncharitable interpretation of mine go wrong?
_________________
I have the questions for all of your answers | | |
sordavie
moderator
Posts: 1354Posted:
Oct 19, 2004 - 02:59 AM |
It sure seems that way Didymus. Maybe we can make a stronger argument. Given modal realism, nothing we do will change the amount of evil or good there is spread throughout the worlds:
1. How we act, given modal realism, doesn't really matter.
2. Some ethical theory is true, that is we ought to act in some ways and not others; and that really matters.
C. Modal realism is false.
We can't help but think 2 is true. 1 is contestable. By reductio C. Perhaps this is more what Adams has in mind. | | |
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