Cracking Open the IQ Box
Howard Gardner
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Works Discussed in This Essay
Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles A. Murray,The Bell Curve:
Intelligence
and Class Structure in American Life. Free Press, 1994
Also Cited
Roger W. Brown and Richard J. Herrnstein, Psychology.
Little, Brown, 1975
Stephen J. Ceci, On Intelligence-More or Less. Prentice
Hall, 1990
Howard Gardner, Frames of Mind:The Theory of Multiple
Intelligences
BasicBooks, 1993
Richard J. Herrnstein, I.Q. in the
Meritocracy.Little,Brown, 1973.
Charles A. Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy,
1950-1980.
BasicBooks, 1984.
Lisbeth B. Schorr, Within Our Reach: Breaking the Cycle of
Disadvantage.
Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1988.
Robert J. Sternberg, Beyond IQ. Cambridge University
Press, 1985.
Harold W. Stevenson and James W. Stigler, The Learning Gap:
Why Our Schools
Are Failing and What We Can Learn from Japanese and Chinese
Education.
Summit Books, 1992.
Despite
its largely technical nature, The Bell Curve has
already secured a prominent place in American consciousness as a
"big," "important," and "controversial" book. In a manner more
befitting a chronicle of sex or spying, the publisher withheld it
from potential critics until the date of publication. Since then
it
has grabbed front-page attention in influential publications,
ridden the talk-show waves, and catalyzed academic conferences
and
dinner table controversies. With the untimely death of the senior
author, psychologist Richard Herrnstein, attention has focused on
his collaborator Charles Murray (described by the New York
Times
Magazine as "the most dangerous conservative in America").
But
this volume clearly bears the mark of both men.
The Bell Curve is a strange work. Some of the analysis and
a good deal of the tone are reasonable. Yet, the science in the
book was questionable when it was proposed a century ago, and it
has now been completely supplanted by the development of the
cognitive sciences and neurosciences. The policy recommendations
of
the book are also exotic, neither following from the analyses nor
justified on their own terms. The book relies heavily on
innuendo,
some of it quite frightening in its implications. The authors
wrap
themselves in a mantle of courage, while coyly disavowing the
extreme conclusions that their own arguments invite. The
tremendous
attention lavished on the book probably comes less from the
science
or the policy proposals than from the subliminal messages and
attitudes it conveys.
Taken at face value, The Bell Curve proceeds in
straightforward fashion. Herrnstein and Murray summarize decades
of
work in psychometrics and policy studies and report the results
of
their own extensive analyses of the National Longitudinal Survey
of
Labor Market Experience of Youth, a survey that began in 1979 and
has followed more than 12,000 Americans aged 14-22. They argue
that studies of trends in American society have steadfastly
ignored
a smoking gun: the increasing influence of measured intelligence
(IQ). As they see it, individuals have always differed in
intelligence, at least partly because of heredity, but these
differences have come to matter more because social status now
depends more on individual achievement. The consequence of this
trend is the bipolarization of the population, with high-IQ types
achieving positions of power and prestige, low-IQ types being
consigned to the ranks of the impoverished and the impotent. In
the
authors' view, the combined ranks of the poor, the criminal, the
unemployed, the illegitimate (parents and offspring), and the
uncivil harbor a preponderance of unintelligent individuals.
Herrnstein and Murray are disturbed by these trends, particularly
by the apparently increasing number of people who have babies but
fail to become productive citizens. The authors foresee the
emergence of a brutal society in which "the rich and the smart"
(who are increasingly the same folks) band together to isolate
and
perhaps even reduce the ranks of those who besmirch the social
fabric.
Scientifically, this is a curious work. If science is narrowly
conceived as simply carrying out correlations and regression
equations, the science in The Bell Curve seems, at least
on
a first reading, unexceptional. (My eyebrows were raised, though,
by the authors' decision to introduce a new scoring system after
they had completed an entire draft of the manuscript. They do not
spell out the reasons for this switch, nor do they indicate
whether
the results were different using the earlier system.) But science
goes far beyond the number-crunching stereotype; scientific
inquiry
involves the conceptualization of problems, decisions about the
kinds of data to secure and analyze, the consideration of
alternative explanations, and, above all, the chain of reasoning
from assumptions to findings to inferences. In this sense, the
science in The Bell Curve is more like special pleading,
based on a biased reading of the data, than a carefully balanced
assessment of current knowledge.
Moreover, there is never a direct road from research to policy.
One
could look at the evidence presented by Herrnstein and Murray, as
many of a liberal persuasion have done, and recommend targeted
policies of intervention to help the dispossessed. Herrnstein and
Murray, of course, proceed in quite the opposite direction. They
report that efforts to raise intelligence have been unsuccessful
and they oppose, on both moral and pragmatic grounds, programs of
affirmative action or other ameliorative measures at school or in
the workplace. Their ultimate solution, such as it is, is the
resurrection of a world they attribute to the Founding Fathers.
These wise men acknowledged large differences in human abilities
and did not try artificially to bring about equality of results;
instead, Herrnstein and Murray tell us, they promoted a society
in
which each individual had his or her place in a local
neighborhood
and was accordingly valued as a human being with dignity.
The Bell Curve is well argued and admirably clear in its
exposition. The authors are, for the most part, fair and thorough
in laying out alternative arguments and interpretations.
Presenting
views that set a new standard for political incorrectness, they
do
so in a way that suggests their own overt discomfort--real or
professed. Rush Limbaugh and Jesse Helms might like the
implications, but they would hardly emulate the hedges and the
"more in sorrow" statements. At least some of the authors'
observations make sense. For example, their critique of the
complex
and often contradictory messages embodied in certain governmental
social policies is excellent, and their recommendations for
simpler
rules are appropriate.
Yet I became increasingly disturbed as I read and reread this
800-page work. I gradually realized I was encountering a style of
thought previously unknown to me: scholarly brinkmanship. Whether
concerning an issue of science, policy, or rhetoric, the authors
come dangerously close to embracing the most extreme positions,
yet
in the end shy away from doing so. Discussing scientific work on
intelligence, they never quite say that intelligence is
all-important and tied to one's genes; yet they signal that this
is
their belief and that readers ought to embrace the same
conclusions. Discussing policy, they never quite say that
affirmative action should be totally abandoned or that
childbearing
or immigration by those with low IQs should be curbed; yet they
signal their sympathy for these options and intimate that readers
ought to consider these possibilities. Finally, the rhetoric of
the
book encourages readers to identify with the IQ elite and to
distance themselves from the dispossessed in what amounts to an
invitation to class warfare. Scholarly brinkmanship encourages
the
reader to draw the strongest conclusions, while allowing the
authors to disavow this intention.
Do Genes Explain Social Class?
In a textbook published in 1975, Herrnstein and his colleague
Roger
Brown argued that the measurement of intelligence has been the
greatest achievement of twentieth-century scientific psychology.
Psychometricians can make a numerical estimate of a person's
intelligence that remains surprisingly stable after the age of
five
or so, and much convergent evidence suggests that the variations
of
this measure of intelligence in a population are determined
significantly (at least 60 percent) by inheritable factors. As
Herrnstein and Murray demonstrate at great length, measured
intelligence correlates with success in school, ultimate job
status, and the likelihood of becoming a member of the
cognitively
entitled establishment.
But correlation is not causation, and it is possible that staying
in school causes IQ to go up (rather than vice versa) or that
both
IQ and schooling reflect some third causative factor, such as
parental attention, nutrition, social class, or motivation.
Indeed,
nearly every one of Herrnstein and Murray's reported correlations
can be challenged on such grounds. Yet, Herrnstein and Murray
make
a persuasive case that measured intelligence--or, more
technically,
"g," the central, general component of measured
intelligence--does
affect one's ultimate niche in society.
But the links between genetic inheritance and IQ, and then
between
IQ and social class, are much too weak to draw the inference that
genes determine an individual's ultimate status in society.
Nearly
all of the reported correlations between measured intelligence
and
societal outcomes explain at most 20 percent of the variance. In
other words, over 80 percent (and perhaps over 90 percent) of the
factors contributing to socioeconomic status lie beyond measured
intelligence. One's ultimate niche in society is overwhelmingly
determined by non-IQ factors, ranging from initial social class
to
luck. And since close to half of one's IQ is due to factors
unrelated to heredity, well over 90 percent of one's fate does
not
lie in one's genes. Inherited IQ is at most a paper airplane, not
a smoking gun.
Indeed, even a sizeable portion of the data reported or alluded
to
in The Bell Curve runs directly counter to the story that
the authors apparently wish to tell. They note that IQ has gone
up
consistently around the world during this century--15 points, as
great as the current difference between blacks and whites.
Certainly this spurt cannot be explained by genes! They note that
when blacks move from rural southern to urban northern areas,
their
intelligence scores also rise; that black youngsters adopted in
households of higher socioeconomic status demonstrate improved
performance on aptitude and achievement tests; and that
differences
between the performances of black and white students have
declined
on tests ranging from the Scholastic Aptitute Test to the
National
Assessment of Educational Practice. In an extremely telling
phrase,
Herrnstein and Murray say that the kind of direct verbal
interaction between white middle-class parents and their
preschool
children "amounts to excellent training for intelligence tests."
On
that basis, they might very well have argued for expanding Head
Start, but instead they question the potential value of any
effort
to change what they regard as the immutable power of inherited
IQ.
Psychology, Biology and Culture
The psychometric faith in IQ testing and Herrnstein and Murray's
analysis are based on assumptions that emerged a century ago,
when
Alfred Binet devised the first test of intelligence for children.
Since 1900, biology, psychology, and anthropology have enormously
advanced our understanding of the mind. But like biologists who
ignore DNA or physicists who do not consider quantum mechanical
effects, Herrnstein and Murray pay virtually no attention to
these
insights and, as a result, there is a decidedly anachronistic
flavor to their entire discussion.
Intoxication with the IQ test is a professional hazard among
psychometricians. I have known many psychometricians who feel
that
the science of testing will ultimately lay bare all the secrets
of
the mind. Some believe a difference of even a few points in an IQ
or SAT score discloses something important about an individual's
or
group's intellectual merits. The world of intelligence testers is
peculiarly self-contained. Like the chess player who thinks that
all games (if not the world itself) are like chess, or the car
salesman who speaks only of horsepower, the psychometrician may
come to believe that all of importance in the mind can be
captured
by a small number of items in the Stanford-Binet test or by one's
ability to react quickly and accurately to a pattern of lights
displayed on a computer screen.
Though Herrnstein deviated sharply in many particulars from his
mentor B.F. Skinner, the analysis in The Bell Curve is
Skinnerian in a fundamental sense: It is a "black box analysis."
Along with most psychometricians, Herrnstein and Murray convey
the
impression that one's intelligence simply exists as an innate
fact
of life--unanalyzed and unanalyzable--as if it were hidden in a
black box. Inside the box there is a single number, IQ, which
determines vast social consequences.
Outside
the closed world of psychometricians, however, a more
empirically sensitive and scientifically compelling understanding
of human intelligence has emerged in the past hundred years. Many
authorities have challenged the notion of a single intelligence
or
even the concept of intelligence altogether. Let me mention just
a
few examples. (The works by Stephen Ceci and Robert Sternberg, as
well as my own, discuss many more.)
Sternberg and his colleagues have studied valued kinds of
intellect
not measured by IQ tests, such as practical intelligence--the
kind
of skills and capacities valued in the workplace. They have shown
that effective managers are able to pick up various tacit
messages
at the workplace and that this crucial practical sensitivity is
largely unrelated to psychometric intelligence. Ralph Rosnow and
his colleagues have developed measures of social or personal
intelligence--the capacities to figure out how to operate in
complex human situations--and have again demonstrated that these
are unrelated to the linguistic and logical skills tapped in IQ
tests.
Important new work has been carried out on the role of training
in
the attainment of expertise. Anders Ericsson and his colleagues
have demonstrated that training, not inborn talent, accounts for
much of experts' performances; the ultimate achievement of chess
players or musicians depends (as your mother told you) on regular
practice over many years. Ceci and others have documented the
extremely high degree of expertise that can be achieved by
randomly
chosen individuals; for example, despite low measured
intelligence,
handicappers at the racetrack successfully employ astonishingly
complex multiplicative models. A growing number of researchers
have
argued that, while IQ tests may provide a reasonable measure of
certain linguistic and mathematical forms of thinking, other
equally important kinds of intelligence, such as spatial,
musical,
or personal, are ignored (this is the subject of much of my own
work). In short, the closed world of intelligence is being opened
up.
Accompanying this rethinking of the concept of intelligence(s),
there is growing skepticism that short paper-and-pencil tests can
get at important mental capacities. Just as "performance
examinations" are coming to replace multiple-choice tests in
schools, many scientists, among them Lauren Resnick and Jean
Lave,
have probed the capacities of individuals to solve problems "on
the
scene" rather than in a testing room, with pencil and paper. Such
studies regularly confirm that one can perform at an expert level
in a natural or simulated setting (such as bargaining in a market
or simulating the role of a city manager) even with a low IQ,
while
a high IQ cannot in itself substitute for training, expertise,
motivation, and creativity. Rather than the pointless exercise of
attempting to raise psychometric IQ (on which Herrnstein and
Murray
perseverate), this research challenges us to try to promote the
actual behavior and skills that we want our future citizens to
have. After all, if we found that better athletes happen to have
larger shoe sizes, we would hardly try to enlarge the feet of the
less athletic.
Scientific
understanding of biological and cultural aspects of
cognition also grows astonishingly with every passing decade.
Virtually no serious natural scientist speaks about genes and
environment any longer as if they were opposed. Indeed, every
serious investigator accepts the importance of both biological
and
cultural factors and the need to understand their interactions.
Genes regulate all human behavior, but no form of behavior will
emerge without the appropriate environmental triggers or
supports.
Learning alters the way in which genes are expressed.
The development of the individual brain and mind begins in utero,
and pivotal alterations in capacity and behavior come about as
the
result of innumerable events following conception. Hormonal
effects
in utero, which certainly are environmental, can cause a
different
profile of cognitive strengths and limitations to emerge. The
loss
of certain sensory capacities causes the redeployment of brain
tissue to new functions; a rich environment engenders the growth
of
additional cortical connections as well as timely pruning of
excess
synapses. Compare a child who has a dozen healthy experiences
each
day in utero and after birth to another child who has a daily
diet
of a dozen injurious episodes. The cumulative advantage of a
healthy prenatal environment and a stimulating postnatal
environment is enormous. In the study of IQ, much has been made
of
studies of identical and fraternal twins. But because of the
influences on cognition in utero and during infancy, even such
studies cannot decisively distinguish genetic from environmental
influences.
Herrnstein and Murray note that measured intelligence is only
stable after age five, without drawing the obvious conclusion
that
the events of the first years of life, not some phlogiston-like
"g," are the principal culprit. Scores of important and
fascinating
new findings emerge in neuroscience every year, but scarcely a
word
of any of this penetrates the Herrnstein and Murray black-box
approach.
Precisely
the same kind of story can be told from the cultural
perspective. Cultural beliefs and practices affect the child at
least from the moment of birth and perhaps sooner. Even the
parents' expectations of their unborn child and their reactions
to
the discovery of the child's sex have an impact. The family,
teachers, and other sources of influence in the culture signal
what
is important to the growing child, and these messages have both
short- and long-term impact. How one thinks about oneself, one's
prospects in this world and beyond, and whether one regards
intelligence as inborn or acquired--all these shape patterns of
activity, attention, and personal investments in learning and
self-improvement. Particularly for stigmatized minorities, these
signals can wreck any potential for cognitive growth and
achievement.
Consider Claude Steele's research on the effects of stereotyping
on
performance. African-American students perform worse than white
students when they are led to believe that the test is an
intellectual one and that their race matters, but these
differences
wash out completely when such "stereotype vulnerable" conditions
are removed.
To understand the effects of culture, no study is more seminal
than
Harold Stevenson and James Stigler's book The Learning Gap:
Why
Our Schools Are Failing and What We Can Learn from Japanese and
Chinese Education (1992). In an analysis that runs completely
counter to The Bell Curve, Stevenson and Stigler show why
Chinese and Japanese students achieve so much more in schools
than
do Americans. They begin by demonstrating that initial
differences
in IQ among the three populations are either nonexistent or
trivial. But with each passing year, East Asian students raise
their edge over Americans, so that by the middle school years,
there is virtually no overlap in reading and mathematics
performance between the two populations.
Genetics, heredity, and measured intelligence play no role here.
East Asian students learn more and score better on just about
every
kind of measure because they attend school for more days, work
harder in school and at home after school, and have
better-prepared
teachers and more deeply engaged parents who encourage and coach
them each day and night. Put succinctly, Americans believe (like
Herrnstein and Murray ) that if they do not do well, it is
because
they lack talent or ability; Asians believe it is because they do
not work hard enough. As a Japanese aphorism has it, "Fail with
five hours of sleep; pass with four." Both predictions tend to be
self-fulfilling. As educator Derek Bok once quipped, Americans
score near to last on almost all measures save one: When you ask
Americans how they think they are doing, they profess more
satisfaction than any other group. Like Herrnstein and Murray,
most
Americans have not understood that what distinguishes the
cultures
is the pattern of self-understanding and motivation, especially
the
demands that we make on ourselves (and on those we care about)
and
the lessons we draw from success and failure--not the structure
of
genes or the shape of the brain.
The Shaky Bridge to Policy
Like Murray's earlier book Losing Ground, The Bell
Curve views most recent governmental attempts at intervention
as doing more harm than good and questions the value of welfare
payments, affirmative action programs, indeed, any kind of
charitable disposition toward the poor. To improve education,
Herrnstein and Murray recommend vouchers to encourage a private
market and put forth the remarkable proposal that the government
should shift funds from disadvantaged to gifted children. And
while
they do not openly endorse policies that will limit breeding
among
the poor or keep the dispossessed from our shores, they stimulate
us to consider such possibilities.
Nowhere did I find the Herrnstein and Murray analysis less
convincing than in their treatment of crime. Incarcerated
offenders, they point out, have an average IQ of 92, eight points
below the national mean. They go on to suggest that since lower
cognitive aptitude is associated with higher criminal activity,
there would be less crime if IQs were higher. But if intelligence
levels have at worst been constant, why did crime increase so
much
between the 1960s and 1980s? Why have crime rates leveled off and
declined in the last few years? Does low IQ also explain the
embarrassing prevalence of white-collar crime in business and
politics or the recent sudden rise in crime in Russia?
Astonishingly, no other influences, such as the values promoted
by
the mass media, play any role in Herrnstein and Murray's
analysis.
Considering how often they remind us that the poor and benighted
at
society's bottom are incapable through no fault of their own,
Herrnstein and Murray's hostility to efforts to reduce poverty
might seem, at the very least, ungenerous. But, at the book's
end,
the authors suddenly turn from their supposed unblinking realism
to
fanciful nostalgia. Having consigned the dispossessed to a world
where they can achieve little because of their own meager
intellectual gifts, Herrnstein and Murray call on the society as
a
whole to reconstitute itself: to become (once again?) a world of
neighborhoods where each individual is made to feel important,
valued, and dignified. They devote not a word to how this return
to
lost neighborhoods is to be brought about or how those with low
IQs
and no resources could suddenly come to feel worthwhile. It is as
if we were watching scenes from Apocalypse Now or
Natural
Born Killers, only to blink for a minute and to find the
movie
concluding with images from a situation comedy or "Mr. Rogers'
Neighborhood."
Rhetorical Bomb-throwing
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the book is its rhetorical
stance. This is one of the most stylistically divisive books that
I have ever read. Despite occasional avowals of regret and the
few
utopian pages at the end, Herrnstein and Murray set up an us/them
dichotomy that eventually culminates in an us-against-them
opposition.
Who are "we"? Well, we are the people who went to Harvard (as the
jacket credits both of the authors) or attended similar colleges
and read books like this. We are the smart, the rich, the
powerful,
the worriers. And who are "they"? They are the pathetic others,
those who could not get into good schools and who don't cut it on
IQ tests and SATs. While perhaps perfectly nice people, they are
simply not going to make it in tomorrow's complex society and
will
probably end up cordoned off from the rest of us under the
tutelage
of a vicious custodial state. The hope for a civil society
depends
on a miraculous return of the spirit of the Founding Fathers to
recreate the villages of Thomas Jefferson or George Bailey (as
played by Jimmy Stewart) or Beaver Cleaver (as played by Jerry
Mather).
How is this rhetorical polarization achieved? At literally dozens
of points in the book, Herrnstein and Murray seek to stress the
extent to which they and the readers resemble one another and
differ from those unfortunate souls who cause our society's
problems. Reviewing the bell curve of the title, Herrnstein and
Murray declare, in a representative passage:
You--meaning the self-selected person who has read this far
into this book--live in a world that probably looks nothing
like the figure. In all likelihood, almost all of your
friends
and professional associates belong to that top Class l
slice.
Your friends and associates who you consider to be unusually
slow are probably somewhere in Class II.
Why is this so singularly off-putting? I would have thought it
unnecessary to say, but if people as psychometrically smart as
Messrs. Herrnstein and Murray did not "get it," it is safer to be
explicit. High IQ doesn't make a person one whit better than
anybody else. And if we are to have any chance of a civil and
humane society, we had better avoid the smug self-satisfaction of
an elite that reeks of arrogance and condescension.
Though there are seven appendices, spanning over 100 pages, and
nearly 200 pages of footnotes, bibliography, and index, one
element
is notably missing from this tome: a report on any program of
social intervention that works. For example, Herrnstein and
Murray
never mention Lisbeth Schorr's Within Our Reach: Breaking the
Cycle of Disadvantage, a book that was prompted in part by
Losing Ground. Schorr chronicles a number of social
programs
that have made a genuine difference in education, child health
service, family planning, and other lightning-rod areas of our
society. And to the ranks of the programs chronicled in Schorr's
book, many new names can now be added. Those who have launched
Interfaith Educational Agencies, City Year, Teach for America,
Jobs
for the Future, and hundreds of other service agencies have not
succumbed to the sense of futility and abandonment of the poor
that
the Herrnstein and Murray book promotes.
When I recently debated Murray on National Public Radio, he was
reluctant to accept the possibility that programs of intervention
might dissolve or significantly reduce differences in
intelligence.
If he did, the entire psychometric edifice that he and Herrnstein
have constructed would collapse. While claiming to confront facts
that others refuse to see, they are blind to both contradictory
evidence and the human consequences of their work. Herrnstein and
Murray, of course, have the right to their conclusions. But if
they
truly believe that blacks will not be deeply hurt by the hints
that
they are genetically inferior, they are even more benighted--dare
I say, even more stupid--than I have suggested.
It is callous to write a work that casts earlier attempts to help
the disadvantaged in the least-favorable light, strongly suggests
that nothing positive can be done in the present climate,
contributes to an us-against-them mentality, and then posits a
miraculous cure. High intelligence and high creativity are
desirable. But unless they are linked to some kind of a moral
compass, their possessors might best be consigned to an island of
glass-bead game players, with no access to the mainland.
Click here for information on the author
Howard Gardner
Copyright © 1999 by The American Prospect, Inc. Preferred Citation:
Howard Gardner, "Cracking Open the IQ Box," The American Prospect no. 20, Winter 1995.
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